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CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 
USE OF DRUG-TRAINED CANINES AS A SEARCH: IN-
CREASED PROTECTION UNDER THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT OR A FURTHER EROSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
GUARANTEES? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Beale,1 the Ninth Circuit held that the 
use of a canine's sense of smell to detect the presence of contra-
band in personal luggage is a limited fourth amendment intru-
sion which may be conducted without a warrant and which may 
be based on an officer's "founded" or "articulable" suspicion 
rather than on probable cause.1I 
The defendant was convicted of possession with intent to 
distribute and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute a 
controlled substance.8 He and a companion had entered the Fort 
Lauderdale Airport terminal together. At the security check-
point, they separated and obtained their seating assignments in-
dependently. They both purchased tickets to San Diego, with a 
change of planes in Houston. After separately departing from 
the ticket counter, the defendant and his companion entered the 
boarding area and sat down together.· Observing this behavior, a 
sheriff's detective suspected that they were drug couriers. II After 
1. 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Ely, J.; the other panel members were Fletcher 
and Reinhardt, JJ.) (as amended JUly 21, 1982; rehearing and rehearing en banc denied 
Aug. 5, 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3321 (U.S. October 18, 1982) (No. 82-
674). 
2. 674 F.2d at 1335. 
3. This was a violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(I), 846 (1976). Section 841(a)(l) pro-
vides in part: "it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to manufac-
ture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dis-
pense a controlled substance." Section 846 provides that "[a]ny person who attempts or 
conspires any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or 
both .... " 
4. 674 F.2d at 1328. 
5. The detective had 2 years of experience working on airport related narcotics 
163 
1
Rouse et al.: Criminal Law & Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983
164 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:163 
briefly questioning them, the detective went to the baggage area 
accompanied by a deputy and a trained canine, "Nick". "Nick", 
an experienced and reliable drug detector, sniffed the vicinity of 
the suspects' bags. The dog "alerted" to defendant's suitcase in-
dicating the presence of narcotics.6 
A computer check on the suspects revealed that the defen-
dant's companion was recently convicted of possessing cocaine. 
In Houston, police officers kept the suspects and their luggage 
under surveillance while the suspects changed planes. They ap-
peared as though they were not travelling together, deplaning 
separately.' 
Agents in San Diego were notified about the suspects' ar-
rival. An officer had a trained canine, "Duster", sniff the sus-
pects' luggage. "Duster", an experienced and reliable drug detec-
tor, "alerted" to the defendant's suitcase and shoulder bag.8 The 
San Diego officers obtained a search warrant for the defendant's 
luggage based upon a sworn affidavit detailing the facts above. 
Cocaine and marijuana were discovered therein.9 
At trial and on appeal from his conviction, defendant con-
tended that the use of the trained canines to sniff his luggage in 
the baggage area of the Fort Lauderdale Airport constituted an 
illegal search.1o He argued, further, that this illegal search 
tainted the evidence found during the search of his luggage in 
San Diego which led to his arrest. 11 The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the dis-
trict court to make a legal and factual determination of whether 
cases. He believed that the suspects behavior and their destination, which was "a known 
center of drug traffic," indicated that they may have been drug couriers. [d. at 1328 n.1 
For a drug courier profile, see generally United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 563-
65 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1980). 
6. 674 F.2d at 1329. "A dog can alert to the drug in a variety of ways; the dog can 
snarl, bark, whine or paw at a container." Comment, United States v. Solis: Have the 
Government's Super-sniffers Come Down with a Case of Nasal Congestion?, 13 SAN DI-
EGO L. REV. 410, 415 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Supersniffers). 
7. 674 F.2d at 1329. 
8. [d. 
9. [d. 
10. [d. 
11. [d. at 1330. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963) for an 
explanation of how the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine may render evidence ob-
tained after the initial illegality "tainted". 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/10
1983] CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 165 
the Fort Lauderdale detective's quantum of suspicion rose to a 
level of articulable suspicion. 12 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Katz Test 
Under traditional analysis, for constitutional protections to 
attach, a police intrusion must initially be held to be a search or 
seizure.13 To invoke the fourth amendment 1. two questions must 
be answered affirmatively: First, has a search or seizure oc-
curred; and second, was the search or seizure unreasonable?UI 
The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States18 held that a 
search occurs when the government has "violated the privacy 
upon which [the defendant] justifiably relied."17 Justice Harlan's 
concurrence announced a two-part test under which (1) the per-
son must show an "actual (subjective) expectation of privacy," 
and (2) that expectation must "be one that society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable."ls Where a search has occurred, it 
12. 674 F.2d at 1336. 
13. See United States v. Lara, 517 F.2d 209, 211 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. 
Johnson, 506 F.2d 674, 675 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 917 (1975); Note, Con-
stitutional Limitations on the Use of Canines to Detect Evidence of Crime, 44 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 973 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Limitations). 
14. The fourth amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches, and seizures 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
15. Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 973. 
16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
17. [d. at 353. the Court declared that: 
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home 
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. 
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area ac-
cessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 
[d. at 351-52 (citations omitted). 
The defendant in Katz was convicted of transmitting wagers across state lines in 
violation of federal law. The evidence used to convict him was gathered by means of an 
electronic surveillance device placed on top of a telephone booth. The Court held that 
the use of the electronic device to intercept conversations in a public telephone booth 
"constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." [d. at 
353. 
18. [d. at 361. For further explanation of Katz, see generally Note, Katz and the 
3
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must take place under authority of warrant to be considered rea-
sonable,19 although there are a number of well defined 
exceptions.20 
Terry and Limited Intrusions 
While the Supreme Court in Katz broadly defined the pro-
tections of the fourth amendment, the Court in Terry v. Ohio21 
recognized the necessity of sanctioning a limited warrantless in-
trusion-a stop followed by a pat-down search for weapons 
based upon a reasonable suspicion22 that an individual may be 
armed and dangerous.as Terry had two results; it established an-
other exception to the warrant requirement, and, more signifi-
cantly, it recognized an exception to the probable cause require~ 
ment. No probable cause to arrest is needed to conduct a valid 
stop and frisk. U Rather, the less stringent requirement of "rea-
Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy or, A Man's Home is His 
Fort, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 63, 65-66 (1974); Supersniffers, supra note 6, at 424 . 
.19. Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 973. 
20. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 357; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 
(1971). There are six major categories of exceptions. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (consent); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) 
(search incident to arrest); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (movable vehi-
cle); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (plain view); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (stop and frisk); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (exigent 
circumstances). 
21. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
22. Reasonable suspicion justifying a particular intrusion requires that "the police 
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." [d. at 21. 
23. [d. at 27. The Court held: 
[d. at 30-31. 
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes un-
usual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light 
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that 
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and pres-
ently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this be-
havior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reason-
able inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the· 
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or 
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and 
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the 
.outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weap-
ons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a 
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any 
weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence 
against the person from whom they were taken. 
24. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975), the Court noted 
that the probable cause exception established in Terry can be applied to both seizures 
4
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sonable suspicion" that the suspect is armed and dangerous is 
sufficient. 211 
The Court clearly stated that this limited intrusion was still 
a search for fourth amendment purposes,26 and rejected the idea 
that "the Fourth Amendment does not come into play at all as a 
limitation upon police conduct if the officers stop short of some-
thing called a 'technical arrest' or a 'full-blown search'."27 A bal-
ancing test was adopted to assess the reasonableness of a protec-
tive pat-down search: the need to search must· be balanced 
against the invasion which the search entails.26 
Luggage Searches 
In United States u. Chadwick,29 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question of whether a person has a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in his luggage.3o In answering the question af-
firmatively, the Court recognized that the primary function of 
luggage is "as a repository of personal effects."31 The Court ex-
tended this notion in Arkansas u. Sanders,82 stating, that as "a 
common repository for one's personal effects," luggage is "inevi-
tably associated with the expectation of privacy."83 In the ab-
sence of exigent circumstances,3f a warrant must be obtained 
and searches in appropriate circumstances. See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 
(1972). 
25. 392 U.S. at 27; See Note, Fourth Amendment-Detention of Occupants During 
a Premises Search: The Winter of Discontent for Probable Cause, 72 J. CRIM. L. CRIMI-
NOLOGY 1246, 1253 n.57 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Winter of Discontent). Following 
Terry, the Supreme Court recognized two other limited exceptions to the probable cause 
requirement. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. 873, 878-87 (1975) (officers 
on roving patrol may stop vehicles at international borders based upon reasonable suspi-
cion that the vehicles contain aliens illegally in the country); Michigan v. Summers, 452 
U.S. 692, 7()()-02 (1981) (valid search warrant implicitly authorizes police to detain an 
occupant who has left the premises, without probable cause for the seizure). 
26. 392 U.S. at 16. 
27. Id. at 19. See Peebles, The Uninvited Canine Nose and the Right to Privacy: 
Some Thoughts on Katz and Dogs, 11 GA. L. REV. 75, 94 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Canine Nose). 
28. 392 U.S. I, 21, citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). 
29. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). 
30. Id. at 13. The specific iBBue was whether a search warrant was required before 
federal agents opened the suspect's locked footlocker which had been lawfully seized 
from the trunk of a parked car. Id. at 3. 
31. Id. at 13. 
32. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). 
33. Id. at 762. 
34. Exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search exist where there is the 
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before a suspect's luggage may be searched.slI 
The Use of Canines in Drug Detection 
The circuit courts have been struggling with the problem of 
how to apply the fourth amendment to the use of police-trained 
canines which detect contraband. The initial question is whether 
the use of such dogs constitutes a search. If the court determines 
there has been a search, the question is then whether the person 
whose privacy interest is invaded enjoys full fourth amendment 
protection-including the requirements of probable cause and a 
warrant as the basis for a legal search. Alternatively, if the use of 
canines in drug detection is not a search, are such persons en-
tirely without constitutional protection from the unreasonable 
employment of these dogs? 
The circuit courts have reached varied results. In United 
States v. Burns, S8 the Tenth Circuit stated that "the olfactory 
activities of a trained police dog legitimately on the premises do 
not constitute a search."s7 The court did not perceive any consti-
tutionally significant difference between a police officer and a 
dog sniffing the piece of luggage, and therefore found that 
neither constitutes a search. S8 
The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Sullivan,s9 held 
danger that the suspect "might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy 
evidence." 433 U.S. at 15. 
35. 1d. at 15; 442 U.S. at 766. In light of the recent decision in United States v. Ross, 
102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), this requirement of a warrant is applicable only to non-automo-
bile situations. The Ross Court held that if a police officer has probable cause to search a 
lawfully stopped automobile for contraband, then he may also search every part of that 
vehicle, including containers which "may conceal the object of the search." 1d. at 2172. 
The Court in Sanders had imposed the warrant requirement upon luggage found in an 
automobile. 442 U.S. at 766. While Ross declined to follow this portion of the Sanders 
opinion, it appears to have upheld the notion of luggage inevitably being associated with 
the reasonable expectation of privacy-in situations other than where the automobile 
exception comes into effect. 1d. at 2165-67. 
36. 624 F.2d 95 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954 (1980). 
37. 624 F.2d at 101. See also United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d 1003 (lOth Cir. 
1977). The suspects in Burns were arrested in the entrance way of their motel room for 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. A limited warrantless search of the room 
incident to the arrest of its occupants was permitted. Thus, the presence of the dog was 
justified. 624 F.2d at 101. 
38. 624 F.2d at 101, citing United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976). 
39. 625 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981). 
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that it is not a search for a trained dog to sniff luggage handled 
by an airline. The court reasoned that "[t]here can be no reason-
able expectation of privacy when any passenger's bags may be 
subjected to close scrutiny for the protection of public safety. "40 
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Goldstein,4. also held that 
the use of drug-trained canines is not a search. The court, how-
ever, did not examine the nature of the privacy interest associ-
ated with the luggage. Rather, it reasoned that since there was 
no legitimate expectation of privacy in the airspace surrounding 
the passenger's luggage, the use of a canine's nose to sniff that 
area did not constitute a search.42 
While these cases place little limitation upon the employ-
ment of canines by police officers for contraband detection, 
other circuits have required a finding that the officer possess a 
reasonable suspicion4s regarding the presence of contraband In 
the area to be searched prior to using the dog. 
In United States v. Fulero," the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit dismissed as "frivolous" the defendant's contention that the 
sniffing of the air around his footlockers was an unconstitutional 
intrusion.411 Giving only brief attention to the search issue, the 
40. [d. at 13. See Bronstein, 521 F.2d at 461-62. 
41. 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.), cert. de·nied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981). 
42. 635 F.2d at 361. In Goldstein, DEA agents became suspicious of the defendants, 
who arrived at an airline ticket counter separately and, although not speaking, cast side 
glances toward each other. They departed the counter separately, then engaged in a 
short conversation. The agents learned that one defendant purchased a ticket and 
checked two bags while the other attempted, but was unable to get, two tickets and 
decided to wait for stand-by. They returned to the ticket counter and purchased tickets. 
A DEA agent standing behind them noted the names on the suitcases. The name on the 
larger suitcase did not match the names under which the tickets were purchased. Defen-
dants checked the bags and DEA agents then brought in a drug-trained dog which 
"alerted" to all the pieces of luggage. [d. at 358-59. 
43. For an explanation of what constitutes reasonable suspicion, see note 22, supra. 
44. 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam). 
45. [d. at 745. In Fulero, a greyhound employee alerted police after "three hippies" 
had brought in footlockers to be shipped to Washington, D.C. The police thought the 
situation appeared suspicious because it was "normal practice" in Yuma to ship mari-
juana through Greyhound, and depot employees had in the past detected packages con-
taining marijuana. The name on the footlockers was of a man suspected of narcotics 
traffic. The police officer noticed the smell of mothballs, frequently used to mask the 
odor of marijuana, emanating from the footlockers. The officer then obtained a mari-
juana-sniffing dog which had been consistently reliable over a period of two years. After 
placing the footlockers among twelve other packages, the dog handler ran the dog 
through the packages. The dog alerted to one of the footlockers three consecutive times. 
[d. at 748-49. 
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court instead based its decision upon whether the conduct of the 
police was reasonable. Applying this test, the court found the 
police officers' conduct to be the "model of intelligent and re-
sponsible procedure," and thus the use of the dogs was 
constitutional. 48 
In United States v. Bronstein, n the Second Circuit ruled 
that the use of canines does not constitute a search, stating that 
no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in luggage trans-
ported by plane.48 While the Supreme Court in Chadwick seems 
to have rejected this reasoning,48 the Bronstein opinion may be 
significant because of the emphasis that the concurrence placed 
upon the existence of reasonable suspicion prior to the use of the 
canines. lIo 
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Klein,1I1 stated 
that the use of canines to sniff "inanimate objects" to detect 
contraband is not an unlawful search under the fourth amend-
ment.1I1 That court, as did the Bronstein court, limited the use 
46. [d. at 749. 
47. 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976). Airline ticket 
agents noticed two men, the defendants, each carrying two similar large new suitcases 
with combination locks. The men purchased tickets separately and acted like strangers, 
but were later seen to be talking "like old friends." The DEA was informed and a drug-
trained dog sniffed the luggage upon defendant's arrival. These facts, the court held, 
constituted reasonable suspicion of the presence of contraband. [d. at 460-61. 
48. 521 F.2d at 462. The court reasoned: "There can be no reasonable expectation of 
privacy when one transports baggage by plane, particularly today when the menace to 
public safety by the skyjacker and the passage of dangerous or hazardous freight compels 
continuing scrutiny of p888engers and their impedimenta." Id. 
49. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33; Beale, 674 F.2d at 1331. 
50. 521 F.2d at 465 (Mansfield, J. concurring). The concurrence "would strictly limit 
[the use of dogs) to cases where there are grounds for [reasonable) suspicion, similar to 
or stronger than that present here, and would not permit a wholesale examination of all 
baggage in the hope that a crime may be detected." [d. 
Th\, Second Circuit, in United States v. Waltzer, 682 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1982), reaf-
firmed its ruling in Bronstein that "canine sniffing is neither a search nor seizure for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment." [d. at 373. The court specifically held that where a 
dog with a record of accuracy designates luggage as containing contraband, probable 
cause has been established for the arrest of the person possessing the luggage. [d. at 372-
73. Further, the Waltzer court responded to the Ninth Circuit's 888ertion in Beale that 
the Supreme Court in Sanders and Chadwick had rejected the Second Circuit's reason-
ing in Bronstein. The Waltzer court stated that the issue is not whether a privacy inter-
est in personal luggage exists, "but whether canine sniffing intrudes on that interest. We 
again hold it does not." [d. at 373. 
51. 626 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1980). 
52. [d. at 26. See, e.g., United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976); United 
8
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of canines to situations where there was a reasonable suspicion 
that luggage contained contraband. liS The court further held that 
the dog must be shown to be a reliable detector.lI. 
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the use of canines in con-
traband detection in United States v. Solis. 1I11 The court broadly 
framed the inquiry as the need to determine "the kind of intru-
sion a free society is willing to tolerate."118 The court determined 
that dog sniffing is a tolerable intrusion and held that "the use 
of the dogs was not unreasonable under the circumstances and 
therefore was not a prohibited search under the fourth 
amendment. "117 
To determine whether the use of the dogs was reasonable, 
the Solis court applied Katz' "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" testll8 to the facts of the case,1I9 finding that the officers' 
use of the dogs was a reasonable response to the situation.80 Fol-
lowing the reasoning of the District of Columbia Circuit in 
Fulero and the Second Circuit in Bronstein,81 the Ninth Circuit 
did not specifically determine whether the dogs' sniffing consti-
States v. Race, 529 F.2d 12, 14 n.2 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 
459 (2d Cir. 1975). 
53. 626 F.2d at 26-27. Agents were reasonably suspicious that defendant's suitcases 
contained contraband where suspicious circumstances (i.e., one defendant was travelling 
under an assumed name, both men said they left their tickets on the plane and denied 
having keys to their suitcases) were coupled with the agent's previous observation of 
defendants and information received from the Florida deputy sheriff. [d. 
54. [d. at 27. 
55. 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976). 
56. [d. at 881. 
57. [d. at 882-83. 
58. [d. at 882. For a discussion of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, see 
supra text accompanying notes 18-20. 
59. An informant told a government drug agent of a white semi-trailer with a paper 
license plate and white powder at the rear doors parked in a designated gas station 
which was open to the public. The drug agent, because of his training and experience, 
knew that marijuana was often smuggled in the floor of semi-trailers and that talcum 
powder was frequently used to mask its odor. The drug agent told this to customs of-
ficers who brought in specially trained marijuana sniffing dogs. There was public access 
to the trailer. The dogs alerted to marijuana in the trailer. [d. at 881. 
60. Specifically, the agents had founded suspicion based upon the partial corrobora-
tion of the informant's statements by confirming the location and description of the 
trailer. The dogs provided further corroboration by detecting the odor of marijuana 
outside the trailer. This served as a basis for the application for a warrant to enter the 
vehicle. [d. at 882. 
61. See supra text accompanying notes 44-50. 
9
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tuted a search.6s Rather, the court merely stated that if it was a 
search, it was reasonable under the circumstances.63 
C. THE COURT'S REASONING 
In Beale, the Ninth Circuit reviewed Katz and its progeny 
to establish that one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
personal luggage.6• The court then framed its inquiry as 
"whether the use of independent monitoring devices, such as 
drug-trained canines, to detect the presence of contraband 
within personal luggage is an invasion of the owner's 'inevitable' 
and 'inherent' privacy interest in the contents therein."611 
In answering this question, the court first examined conven-
tional detection devices. These fall into two broad categories: (1) 
mechanical sense-enhancers, such as flashlights and binoculars, 
and, (2) independent detection devices, such as electronic sur-
veillance equipment.66 The court reasoned that since the dog 
does not amplify its handler's perception, but rather replaces it, 
it is more like an independent detection device than a sense en-
hancer.67 The significance of this categorization is that the use of 
canines constitutes a search subject to the full requirements of 
the fourth amendment.68 
However, having established the similarity between the use 
of the dogs and independent detection devices, the court then 
found the use of trained dogs to be "sufficiently distinct and less 
intrusive" than usual independent devices-thus warranting a 
different treatment.etl Following its reasoning in Solis, the Ninth 
Circuit stated that drug-detecting dogs can be used with a "min-
imal invasion of privacy."7o The canine's sense of smell is highly 
62. 536 F.2d at 882. 
63. [d. 
64. 674 F.2d at 1331. See supra text accompanying notes 13-20, 29-35. 
65. 674 F.2d at 1331. 
66. [d. at 1333. 
67. [d. 
68. [d. at 1333 n.12. The use of independent detection devices (e.g., magnometers 
and x-ray scans) haa been uniformly held to be a search. See, e.g., United States v. 
Henry, 615 F.2d 1223, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1980) (x-ray scan); United States v. Albarado, 
495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974) (magnometer). 
69. 674 F.2d at 1334. 
70. [d., citing Solis, 536 F.2d at 882. 
10
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discriminate, detecting only the presence of contraband.71 
Therefore, an innocent person's privacy is subject to no intru-
sion.72 Additionally, the only errors that properly trained 
canines make are ones of omission.73 These reasons led the court 
to hold that the use of drug-trained dogs is a limited fourth 
amendment intrusion.74 
The court found that classifying the actions of the dog as a 
limited intrusion allows the police to use them without a war-
rant and without a showing of probable cause.n However, the 
court established a standard of "founded" or "articulable" suspi-
cion to replace the probable cause requirement.78 This standard 
was derived from the condition, as imposed by the courts in 
Solis, Klein, Bronstein and Fulero, that the officers harbor a 
reasonable suspicion of the presence of contraband in luggage 
before using the dogs.77 The Ninth Circuit's finding was ex-
pressly premised on the concept of canine reliability, a fact 
which the government must establish.78 Should either the canine 
prove unreliable or the government fail to establish the dog's re-
liability, then the prerequisites of an ordinary search must be 
complied with.79 
Finally, the court would limit the use of drug-detecting dogs 
in two areas. First, the dogs should not be used to sniff luggage 
in close proximity to people.so Second, the court suggested that a 
reexamination of the "intrusion issue" may be in order if the 
71. 674 F.2d at 1334. 
72. [d. See Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 987. 
73. 674 F.2d at 1334. One wonders whether the court's holding extends to improp-
erly trained canines. 
74. [d. at 1335. 
75. [d. 
76. [d. 
77. [d. See supra notes 42, 47, 53, 59 and 60 for examples of facts constituting "spe-
cific" or "articulable" suspicion. The Ninth Circuit stated that its holding in Beale was 
"consistent with the unarticulated reasoning" of Solis, Klein, Goldstein and Fulero. 674 
. F.2d at 1335. Further, to the extent that Burns, Sullivan, and Bronstein (see text accom-
panying notes 36-42, supra) depart from this "unstated rationale," the Ninth Circuit 
declined to follow them. 674 F.2d at 1335 n.20. An interpretation of these statements 
may be that since these courts required a finding of reasonable-or founded or articul-
able-suspicion, they were tacitly acknowledging that the use of the dogs is a limited 
intrusion. However, precisely what the court meant is unclear. 
78. 674 F.2d at 1335 n.14. 
79. [d. 
80. [d. at 1335 n.20. 
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dogs are to be used in situations "less pervasively regulated than 
airports. "81 
D. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit in Beale is the first circuit to expressly 
recognize that the use of drug-trained canines falls within the 
ambit of the fourth amendment. The court nevertheless asserted 
that those cases it relied on had impliedly recognized this.82 
However, this assertion is questionable as to its accuracy and its 
wisdom. 
To begin with, both the Fulero and Bronstein courts explic-
itly stated that the use of canines is not a constitutional intru-
sion.83 Second, the courts in Klein and Solis held that the use of 
the dogs was not a prohibited or an unlawful search under the 
fourth amendment.84 The phrase "not an unlawful search," how-
ever, does not necessarily imply that the use of the dogs is some 
type of lawful constitutional intrusion. For the Ninth Circuit to 
state that it based its holding in Beale on the "unarticulated 
reasoning" of the foregoing cases811 indicates that the court may 
have drawn unreasonable inferences from those opinions. 
Although the Ninth Circuit found that the use of drug-de-
tecting canines comes within the purview of the fourth amend-
ment, much ambiguity attended this finding. The court identi-
fied the use of independent detection devices as "searches" 
subject to "full" fourth amendment requirements.86 Such speci-
ficity did not accompany its findings as to the use of canines. 
The court identified the use of the dogs as "sufficiently distinct 
81. [d. at 1336 n.20. 
82. The court stated: 
We hold-consistent with the unarticulated reasoning of 
[Solis, Klein, Bronstein and FuleroJ-that the use of a ca-
nine's keen sense of smell to detect the presence of contraband 
within personal luggage is a Fourth Amendment intrusion, al-
beit a limited one that may be conducted without a warrant 
and which may be based on an officer's 'founded' or 'articul-
able' suspicion rather than probable cause. 
674 F.2d at 1335 (emphasis added). 
83. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48. 
84. See supra text accompanying notes 51-57. 
85. See supra note 82. 
86. Beale, 674 F.2d at 1334. See supra text accompanying notes 66-74. 
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and less intrusive" so as "to warrant a different treatment"87 
than that given independent detection devices, studiously avoid-
ing using the term "search". It employed the term "intrusion" or 
some variation thereon.88 The court thus appeared to be estab-
lishing a category of intrusions that is something less than a 
search. This seemingly the case, two criticisms merit mentioning. 
At a basic level, if the use of the dogs is not a search, then it is 
unclear how the fourth amendment applies to this situation.89 
The fourth amendment addresses "searches" not "intrusions".90 
Although this may appear to be a mere quibbling with seman-
tics, all fourth amendment cases involving potential searches 
turn upon the designation of the action as a search.91 By using 
the word "intrusion" the court injected unnecessary ambiguity 
into its opinion. One possible interpretation is that the court is 
attempting to establish a new category of actions subject to 
fourth amendment constraints-i.e., "limited intrusions". 
At first glance, Beale appears to grant increased constitu-
tional protection from police intrusions. And in the narrow area 
of police dog usage, it accomplishes this purpose; it brings the 
use of these dogs under a system of regulation which affords pro-
tection from unrestrained "sniff" searches. But upon further re-
flection, this decision has a stronger, more detrimental impact 
upon the broad constitutional guarantees of the fourth amend-
ment. It introduces another exception to the warrant clause and, 
perhaps more significantly, to the probable cause requirement. 
The Supreme Court has sanctioned only three exceptions to 
the probable cause requirement.92 These exceptions substitute 
the less stringent standard of "reasonable suspicion" in place of 
probable cause in strictly delineated circumstances.93 By citing 
Terry in reference to the standard for founded or articulable 
suspicion94 (i.e., reasonable suspicion), the Beale court indicated 
it is tacitly following the Terry precedent regarding its exception 
87. 674 F.2d at 1334. 
88. 1d. at 1334-36. 
89. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15. 
90. See supra note 14. 
91. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
92. See supra notes 24-25 and text accompanying notes 21-25. 
93. See supra notes 23-25. 
94. Beale, 674 F.2d at 1328 n.l. See supra note 22 for the Terry test of reasonable 
suspicion. 
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to the probable cause requirement. It is analogizing to a rule 
which the Supreme Court, in Terry, Brignoni-Ponce, and Sum-
mers strictly limited to the facts of those cases. As one commen-
tator has recently pointed out, "[b]y expanding the scope of ex-
ceptions to the probable cause requirement," its further 
deterioration is harkened. ell The Ninth Circuit has added to this 
portentous expansion with Beale. 
Since the Ninth Circuit in Beale adopted a result analogous 
to that of Terry, the court would have done better to have 
drawn a parallel between canine-sniffing and pat-down 
searches." In both instances, courts have limited police activity 
which stops short of the traditional concepts of a search or 
seizure. While Beale identified the facts which make the use of 
dogs a limited Fourth Amendment intrusion," it did not discuss 
the underlying tension between law enforcement needs and pro-
tecting individual privacy-as the Supreme Court had done in 
Terry. Acknowledging this tension would have lent a greater de-
gree of cohesiveness between the result in Beale and fourth 
amendment principles. 
Although this limited fourth amendment intrusion is pre-
mised upon an officer's "founded" or "articulable" suspicion, the 
Beale court declined to find whether the officer in Beale pos-
sessed the requisite suspicion. The court's refusal to make this 
determination may lessen Beale's practical impact on this area 
of search and seizure law. Police officers and lower courts need 
guidelines to correctly implement and interpret appellate court 
decisions. If they do not receive such direction, then the Beale 
decision has done little to effectuate the change in police proce-
dures which were the object of the court's attention. 
Cheryl C. Rouse· 
95. Winter of Discontent, supra note 25, at 1247. For a thorough analysis of fourth 
amendment principles and the threat to their internal integrity, see Amsterdam, Per-
spectives of the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 393-95 (1974). 
96. See supra text accompanying notes 21-27. 
97. See supra text accompanying notes 69-74. 
• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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ELECTRONIC DETECTION DEVICES: A SEARCH BY ANY 
OTHER NAME .. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Brock, l a divided Ninth Circuit panella 
held that the installation and monitoring of an electronic sur-
veillance device located in a residence did not constitute a 
search.s 
In January, 1978, a chemical company contacted the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) after the defendants placed a large 
order for certain chemicals used in manufacturing amphet-
amines.4 When the chemicals were delivered to the company in 
March, DEA agents placed them in a container with a false bot-
tom containing an electronic tracking device (a beeper).' After 
the defendants picked up the chemicals in Lewiston, Idaho, they 
were visually and electronically monitored by the DEA agents. 
The agents tracked the chemicals to a house in Clarkston, 
Washington, and then found the signal a few days later in 
Meacham, Oregon.8 Surveillance was maintained in Meacham, 
and a search warrant was obtained but never executed. The de-
fendants were finally arrested in a mobile home in Hermiston, 
1. 667 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Sneed, J.; the other panel members were 
Fletcher, J., concurring, and Adams, J., sitting by designation, concurring) (as amended 
March 15, 1982; rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, June 3, 1982), cert. denied, 103 
S. Ct. 1271 (1983). For previous cases involving the same defendants, see United States 
v. Bernard, 607 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1979), and United States v. Bernard, 623 F.2d 551 
(9th Cir. 1979). 
2. Although no members of the panel dissented from the holding in Brock, both 
Judges Adams and Fletcher disagreed with Judge Sneed's reasoning. The concurring 
judges would have dissented from the court's holding had there been no binding Ninth 
Circuit precedent on the issue. See infra text accompanying notes 16-20. Thus, in terms 
of the court's reasoning, the majority opinion is that of Judge Adams' since Judge 
Fletcher "concur(redl fully in Judge Adams' opinion .... " 667 F.2d at 1325. Future 
Ninth Circuit decisions will have to clarify exactly what the opinion in Brock stands for. 
3. The defendants also contested the introduction of a co-conspirator's out of court 
statement, the variance between the evidence at trial and the conspiracy charged, the 
failure to suppress co-conspirator's statements, the warrantless search of the motor home 
where the chemicals were found; 667 F.2d at 1315-18, and the particularity and probable 
cause for the search warrant. [d. at 1322-23. 
4. The chemicals, phenyl-2-propanone and methylamine, are not illegal to possess, 
but are necessary ingredients to manufacture Methamphetamine, a controlled substance 
under 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (1976). 
5. 667 F.2d at 1314. 
6. Contact was lost twice during the surveillance, and was reestablished only 
through the beeper. 667 F.2d at 1314. 
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Oregon, after they had picked up a third order for the chemicals 
and attempted to manufacture amphetamines in the mobile 
home.7 
B. BACKGROUND 
Prior to 1967, use of an electronic device was not considered 
a search unless there was an actual trespass upon the defen-
dant's property.s If there was no physical intrusion onto the in-
dividual's premise or property, there was no fourth amendment 
violation. 
In Katz v. United States,9 the Supreme Court held that an 
electronic listening device attached to the outside of a public 
telephone booth constitutes a search under the fourth amend-
ment. That the telephone was in a public phone booth, and that 
there was no actual physical penetration into the walls of the 
booth was not controlling because, as determined by the Court, 
the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."IO No 
physical intrusion is necessary, for "it becomes clear that the 
reach of [the fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence 
or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. "11 
Thus, the Court recognized the necessity of a doctrine which 
would protect the individual from violations of protected rights 
in an age of increased electronic sophistication. 
Though the Court in Katz had finally reconsidered the 
property notions formerly relied upon to determine whether 
there was a fourth amendment intrusion, it was the concurring 
opinion of Justice Harlan that proposed a standard for the lower 
courts to follow. This two prong test first examines whether "a 
person ... exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of pri-
7. The DEA arrested the defendants and then searched the mobile home which ap-
parently was the defendants' laboratory. [d. at 1314-15. 
8. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). In Silverman, the Court held 
that the use of a device inserted into the outer wall of the defendant's house was a 
search. The concurring opinion by Justice Douglas seemed to foreshadow the Katz deci-
sion by noting that an invasion of privacy occurs regardless of the means used. He 
stated: "Our concern should not be with the trivialities of the local law of trespass . . . . 
[T)he Fourth Amendment [should not) be limited by nice distinctions turning on the 
kind of electronic equipment employed." 365 U.S. at 513. 
9. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
10. [d. at 351. 
11. [d. at 353. 
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vacy and, second, [whether] the expectation [is] one that society 
is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'."12 The first aspect of the 
test deals with the particular individual's conduct and expecta-
tions; the second with society's expectations and whether the in-
dividual's conduct was reasonable in light of such expectations.13 
The Katz test was applied by the Supreme Court in Smith 
v. Maryland,14 where the use of a pen register, a device which 
records the phone numbers dialed from a phone but not the con-
tents of the conversation, was held not to constitute a search. 
The Court noted that the defendant's conduct, the dialing of the 
phone, lessened his expectation of privacy by revealing informa-
tion to the phone company. Even though he dialed from a pri-
vate phone located in his home, the pen register did not violate 
the defendant's fourth amendment rights since he voluntarily 
exposed the numbers he dialed to a third party.16 
Ninth Circuit Precedent 
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of 
the installation and use of beepers, and the lower courts have 
struggled to apply the Katz test in this area. In its major deci-
sion dealing with beepers, United States v. Dubrofsky,18 the 
Ninth Circuit held that the use of such devices does not consti-
tute a search. The court stated that the constitutionality of the 
use of an electronic device must be analyzed in a two step test; it 
must first be determined whether the installation of the device 
violated the fourth amendment, and then whether the act of 
12. [d. at 361. 
13. The first prong pertains to the subjective expectations which are manifested to 
the outside world. For example, if a person closes the door to a public phone booth, as in 
Katz, he exhibits an objective showing of his subjective expectations of privacy from the 
uninvited ear. Yet, if that person leaves up the window shades in his home, he manifests 
a lesser expectation of privacy. Most courts have attempted to stay away from a test 
which would analyze the actual expectations of the individual. See United States v. 
Sledge, 650 F.2d 1075, 1077 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 
(2d Cir. 1980). 
14. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
15. The Court in Smith noted that defendant's conduct of dialing from his private 
phone was calculated to keep the contents of his conversation private. However, the act 
of dialing lessened his expectation of privacy as to the number he dialed. [d. at 742-43. 
16. 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978). A beeper was placed in a package of heroin after a 
lawful customs search revealed the drug in the defendant's mail. The device was able to 
track the location of the heroin as well as to signal when the package was opened. [d. at 
210. 
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monitoring, using the beeper, violated the fourth amendment. In 
formulating this two tiered approach, the Ninth Circuit relied 
upon two prior decisions. In United States v. Pretzinger,17 the 
circuit court noted that "no warrant is needed to justify installa-
tion of an electronic beeper unless fourth amendment rights nec-
essarily would have to be violated in order to initially install the 
device. "18 With respect to surveillance, Dubrofsky relied upon 
United States v. Hufford,11 which held that there is no constitu-
tional difference between normal visual surveillance and the use 
of a beeper as the surveillance device. Based on these two deci-
sions, the court in Dubrofsky held that neither the installation 
of a beeper in a package of heroin discovered in a lawful customs 
search, nor the subsequent surveillance of defendant's return 
trip to his home after picking up the package constituted a 
search.IIO 
Division in the Circuit Courts 
The other circuits are divided on the constitutionality of the 
installation and usage of beepers. The majority of circuits have 
held that there is no search, or if there is a search, there is 
proper justification to exclude the search from the necessity of a 
warrant. There are primarily four categories in which the deci-
sions can be placed. 
First, some courts have held that when the initial placement 
is made with the consent of a third party, there is no fourth 
amendment violation in the installation. 111 This reasoning has 
17. 542 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1976). The court upheld the warrantless attachment of an 
electronic tracking device to an airplane. Since the court held there was no search. there 
was no necessity for obtaining a warrant. 
18. Id. at 520. 
19. 539 F.2d 32. 34 (9th Cir.). cert. denied. 429 U.S. 1002 (1976). The court upheld 
the warrantless installation of a beeper in a container holding caffeine and the subse-
quent surveillance by the government. noting that there was no reasonable expectation 
of privacy while the defendant drove on public roads. 539 F.2d at 33-34. 
20. 581 F.2d 208. 211. 
21. United States v. Knotts. 662 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1981). rev 'd. 103 S. Ct. 1081 
(1983) (consent of seller to install beeper in can of chloroform binding on purchaser); 
United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir.). cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979) 
(consent of lessor of airplane to install beeper); United States v. Lewis. 621 F.2d 1382 
(5th Cir. 1980). cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981) (no search where chemical company 
agreed to switch drug from original container to container with beeper); United States v. 
Abel. 548 F.2d 591 (5th Cir.). cert. denied. 431 U.S. 956 (1977); United States v. 
Cheshire. 569 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.). cert. denied. 437 U.S. 907 (1978) (consent of seller to 
18
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been applied when the defendant is a renter,lI2 or has become 
the new owner of the premises or objects in question. as A minor-
ity of circuits has rejected third party consent as applied to a 
change in ownership of the article which contains the beeper.24 
Many courts have upheld the installation and subsequent 
surveillance as constitutional when the owner of the item to 
which the beeper is attached has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in that item. In these cases, the container is usually 
holding contraband, and thus there is no objectively justifiable 
expectation of privacy in its ownership.2a This doctrine has been 
applied when the item containing the beeper is exchanged for 
contraband. liS In order for the installation of the beeper to be 
upheld as constitutional, the agents must not violate the defen-
dant's fourth amendment rights in some manner unrelated to its 
installation. 27 
A third line of reasoning states that there is no search when 
the object monitored has a lessened expectation of privacy sur-
rounding its usage. IS Relying on Supreme Court decisions noting 
the lessened expectation of privacy associated with automobiles, 
many lower courts have upheld the placement of electronic 
install beeper in drum of chemicals binding on purchaser). 
22. In United States v. Cheshire, 569 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 
(1978), the court held that the consent of the owner of a plane rented to the defendant 
came within the third party consent exception to the warrant requirement. 
23. In United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 
(1979), the court held that the consent of the prior owner is sufficient for consent involv-
ing beepers. 
24. See United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1980), where the court held 
that the consent of the prior owner (the government) was ineffectual when there is a 
transfer of ownership. See also United States v. One 1967 Cessna Aircraft, 454 F. Supp. 
1352 (C.D. Cal. 1978). 
25. United States v. Pringle, 576 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1978) (heroin found in legal 
customs search); United States v. Washington, 586 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978) (cocaine 
discovered in legal customs search); United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1978) 
(cocaine discovered at customs inspection). 
26. United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976) 
(no search where beeper inserted in television set later exchanged for heroin). 
27. Therefore, illegally opening the defendant's mail may constitute a search, re-
gardless of whether it contains contraband, and the subsequent installation of the beeper 
may be a "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
28. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132 (1924). In Cardwell. the Supreme Court noted the lessened expectation of privacy 
surrounding an automobile, because "it travels on public thoroughfares where both its 
occupants and its contents are in plain view." 417 U.S. at 590. 
19
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beepers on automobiles and the subsequent surveillance.29 These 
courts assume, without deciding, that there is a search, but that 
the automobile exception provides the justification for the war-
rantless use of the beeper. 30 
Finally, some courts have held that the usage and surveil-
lance of beepers constitute a search. These decisions have either 
rejected the other catagorizations or have found that none of the 
categories apply.81 In United States v. Bailey,32 the Sixth Cir-
cuit specifically rejected the holding in Dubrofsky, and held that 
probable cause and a warrant are necessary when an electronic 
device is used. The court in Bailey rejected the notion that the 
prior owner could consent to the insertion of the beeper in the 
container, noting that "electronic surveillance has such a poten-
tial for abuse that the government must be held accountable for 
its use."33 Since the warrant obtained for the beeper for the non-
contraband item was defective, the court held inadmissable the 
evidence seized.34 
29. See United States v. Frazier. 538 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1976). cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 1046 (1977) (beeper attached to a car bumper is a minimal intrusion. therefore 
probable cause to search suffices); United States v. Moore. 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977). 
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978) (probable cause sufficient when beeper placed on 
automobile). 
30. See, e.g., United States v. Michael. 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1981). In Michael, the 
court aasumed there waa a search when the agents placed a beeper on the defendant's 
van. but considered the agents' reaaonable suspicion sufficient justification for the place-
ment of a beeper on the van. See also United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 
1977). cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978). 
31. United States v. Bailey. 628 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Moore, 
562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Holmes. 
521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975). aff'd en bane, 537 F.2d 227 (1976). 
32. 628 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1980). 
33. 1d. at 947. 
34. The court in Bailey sharply critized the Ninth Circuit's reaaoning in Dubrofsky. 
The Bailey court stated that the "fourth amendment does not overlook de minimis in-
trusions. An intrusion is not de minimis if it violates an individual's legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy." 628 F.2d at 940. The court also considered erroneous the comparison 
between sense enhancement devices and beepers made in Dubrofsky: "Such sense en-
hancement ordinarily would not constitute a search under our analysis because an indi-
vidual does not have a justifiable expectation of privacy in information a Government 
agent could acquire lawfully under conditions more favorable to sensory reception." 628 
F.2d at 940 n.9. 
The Ninth Circuit replied to this criticism in the Brock decision. First. Judge Sneed 
noted that the court in Bailey relied on a mistaken notion that there is a distinction 
between the insertion of a beeper in contraband and noncontraband. The court noted 
that in Dubrofsky, "[w)e did not make any such distinction with regard to whether a 
person's expectation of privacy waa ·legitimate· ... and went on to state that "Dubrofsky 
simply did not address the effect that the nature of the item had on a person's 'reaaona-
20
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C. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Brock, the court dealt only with whether the monitoring 
of the beeper in the defendants' private residence violated the 
defendants' reasonable expectation of privacy. The court stated 
that the installation was not, nor could not, be challenged since 
the beeper was placed in the container while it was in the lawful 
possession of the DEA.8& Nor was there any fourth amendment 
violation during the surveillance of the defendants' automobile 
which held the container.88 The inquiry was limited to whether 
the monitoring of the beeper while in the defendants' residence 
from March 27th to March 28th was a search.87 
Judge Sneed's Opinion 
Judge Sneed utilized Justice Harlan's two prong analysis to 
determine whether the two day monitoring was a search. He 
agreed that the "appellant's expectation of privacy was reasona-
ble," but stated "[t]he question before us is whether such a rea-
sonable expectation has been invaded. "88 Comparing the fact sit-
uation in Brock to Dubrofsky,89 Judge Sneed pointed out that 
since the intrusion of one's privacy by "the beeper is "very 
slight," and the device is similar "to other enhancement devices 
that aid the five senses,"40 there was no search. He noted that 
the Katz holding had made property concepts obsolete with re-
ble' expectations of privacy." 667 F.2d at 1320 n.9. 
Judge Sneed also noted Bailey's criticism of the intrusiveness doctrine in Dubrofsky 
and stated: "We disagree with the Sixth Circuit's criticism." 667 F.2d at 1321 n.11. Judge 
Sneed pointed out that the Supreme Court uses a similar doctrine, and that "unless 
there is an 'invasion' of the defendant's interest, the fact that the defendant had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, is immaterial. In order to determine if it is 'reasonable' 
for society to recognize the defendant's expectation of privacy, one must determine the 
degree of intrusiveness." [d. 
35. The decision in United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 1002 (1976), may have precluded any challenge to the installation by the DEA. 
36. The holdings in Hufford and United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 
1976) would have defeated a challenge to beeper surveillance of an automobile driven on 
public highways. The court in Hufford stated: "We see no distinction between visual 
surveillance and the use of an electronic beeper to aid the agents in following the move-
ments of an automobile along public roads .... " 539 F.2d at 34. 
37. The defendants did not have standing to challenge the initial installation of the 
beeper into the container and the surveillance of the automobile because they lacked 
ownership of the items at the time of "entry". Brief for Appellant at 22, United States v. 
Brock, 667 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982). 
38. 667 F.2d at 1320. 
39. See supra note 16. 
40. 667 F.2d at 1321. 
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spect to electronic devices and the fourth amendment. 
Judge Sneed considered the use of the beeper as a form of 
sense enhancement similar to a helicopter search4} and the use 
of a trained dog.42 He summarized his position by stating that 
"the minimal intrusion occasioned by the use of the location 
beeper lawfully installed in a noncontraband item that was 
taken into a private residence is not a search."43 Even though 
there may have been a technical trespass committed when the 
beeper was carried into the defendants' residence unknowingly, 
"[t]he slight physical intrusion, by reason of the beeper itself, 
was insignificant."44 
The opinion also noted that there was a limitation to the 
warrantless usage of electronic devices: "At some point the 
amount and specificity of the information revealed and the du-
ration of the monitoring would require the use of the particular 
sense-enhancement device to be characterized as a search."411 Be-
cause in Brock the monitoring occurred for only two days before 
a warrant was sought, there was no search.46 
Judge Adams' Concurrence 
The concurring opinion by Judge Adams noted that the is-
sues presented in Brock were more complex than indicated by 
Judge Sneed's opinion. There is division among the circuits on 
the issue of beeper surveillance, and other circuits would have 
41. See United Stetes v. Allen, 633 F.2d at 1282 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 833 (1981). In Allen, the court held that the use of a helicopter and a telephoto lens 
to observe activity occurring on defendant's property did not constitute a search. 
42. See United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976). In Solis, the court held 
that no search was committed by using a trained canine to detect drugs in defendant's 
mobile home. The canine smelled the drugs from a road which had a public access. But 
see United Stetes v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982), in which the Ninth Circuit 
limited the holdings of Allen and Solis. In Beale, the court steted that "Our decision in 
Allen was premised on the necessarily reduced expectetion of privacy held by the defen-
dant because of the location of the area searched." 674 F.2d at 1333 n.ll. Of Solis, the 
court noted that the lower court in Beale had "misconstrued Solis as holding that canine 
sniffing is not a fourth amendment intrusion at all .... " [d. at 1336 (emphasis in 
original). 
43. 667 F.2d at 1322. 
44. [d. at 1321. 
45. [d. at 1322. 
46. [d. It is interesting to note that the warrant obteined later was a search warrant 
to search the house, not a warrant to continue the use of the beeper. 
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held differently given the facts of Brock .. n However, Judge Ad-
ams, sitting by designation from the Third Circuit, considered 
himself bound by Ninth Circuit precedent, and reluctantly 
agreed with the court's holding.48 He pointed out that the Ninth 
Circuit has made no distinction "between beepers placed in non-
contraband material and those planted in contraband material, 
or between beepers monitored in private areas and those at-
tached to moving vehicles. "49 
Finally, Judge Adams expressed his belief that considering 
the division among the circuits, a warrant should still be ob-
tained whenever possible. Though the holding of the court 
stands for the proposition that a warrant is not necessary in the 
Ninth Circuit, he warned that law enforcement officials should 
obtain warrants because when the Supreme Court decides this 
issue, it may invalidate convictions based on the warrantless use 
of beepers. llo 
Judge Fletcher's Concurrence 
While Judge Fletcher's concurring opmlOn strongly dis-
agreed with the reasoning of Judge Sneed's opinion, she, like 
Judge Adams, considered herself bound by Ninth Circuit prece-
dent. Judge Fletcher's primary disagreement with Judge Sneed's 
analysis was whether Katz abandoned notions of property con-
cepts. Judge Fletcher argued that property concepts are still es-
sential in determining whether there is a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. In any such inquiry, the "physical surroundings of 
necessity form part of what is reasonable," and it is necessary to 
consider "the context of the immediate physical surroundings 
•••• "111 Judge Fletcher noted that Judge Sneed's opinion did 
not correctly distinguish between "surveillance of a suspect on 
the street and monitoring him inside his home. "112 Instead of 
noting the importance of this distinction, Judge Sneed chose "to 
47. See United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1081 
(1983); United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Moore, 562 
F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978). 
48. Brock, 667 F.2d at 1324, citing United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 
1980); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Huf-
ford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976). 
49. 667 F.2d at 1324. 
50. [d. at 1324-25. 
51. [d. at 1325. 
52. [d. at 1326. 
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balance the rights of the people to be secure in their homes 
against the needs of law enforcement. "118 Yet, such balancing is 
inappropriate since "[f]ourth amendment protections should not 
be eroded, however, merely because the government has a strong 
suspicion as to the identification of the perpetrator of a serious 
crime."114 Finally, Judge Fletcher noted that because of Dubrof-
sky, she found herself "in the difficult position of acquiescing in 
the government's conduct in this case . "1111 
D. CRITIQUE 
The major problem with the Brock decision is that the di-
vergence in the court's reasoning will lead to confusion in apply-
ing the court's rule, thereby leaving future courts without a clear 
standard to follow. As a result, the holding in Brock may have 
the effect of greatly expanding the unrestrained use of beepers. 
Under the Ninth Circuit's holding, once a device has been le-
gally installed, almost any degree .of subsequent monitoring is 
legal. 118 As long as the device used does not convey the contents 
of a conversation, there is no search. The court in Dubrofsky 
made clear that to be considered a search, the device would have 
to be equivalent to a wiretap.1I7 Brock seems to have extended 
this equivalency formula to include attachment to noncontra-
band items taken into the home. In reaching this result, the 
court erroneously relied on Smith v. Maryland,1I8 and misapplied 
the holding in Katz. 
The court did not have to deal with the issue of the DEA's 
installation of the beeper into the container. The installation vi-
olated no fourth amendment rights since the container was 
"lawfully in the possession of the DEA"1I9 when the beeper was 
53. [d. 
54. [d. 
55. [d. 
56. The court enunciated no standard which would limit its holding, short of the 
warning that there will be fourth amendment protections "[alt some point ...... 667 
F.2d at 1322. This leaves no workable standard for the lower courts and the police to 
follow. 
57. The court in Dubrolsky stated that "The issue before us is whether the mere 
presence of the beeper, it having been attached without violating the Fourth Amend-
ment, sufficiently resembles a wiretap to require the 'antecedent justification' that" a war-
rant would provide." 581 F.2d at 211. 
58. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
59. 667 F.2d at 1319 n.4. 
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originally installed.60 Nor did the court deal with the issue that a 
change in ownership of the container might have raised. Accord-
ing to Brock, though there is a later change in ownership when 
the defendants picked up the chemicals, the prior owner's con-
sent (i.e., the drug company) is sufficient to bind the new own-
ers.6! Judge Sneed did not state any Supreme Court precedent 
for this proposition, and indeed the Supreme Court has indi-
cated a contrary conclusion.62 The fact that the DEA may have 
been in lawful possession of the container at one time, and thus 
had the legal ability to install the beeper at that time, does not 
create a continual right to search.6s The container held a non-
controlled substance, consequently the defendants may have had 
a reasonable objective expectation of privacy in the container. 
That the chemicals might have been used to manufacture an il-
legal drug should not affect whether the defendants had an ex-
pectation of privacy at the time the chemicals were legal to 
possess.6• 
The Brock decision is distinguishable from decisions up-
holding the installation of a beeper on an automobile or air-
plane,611 because the mobility of those vehicles requires a differ-
60. In Dubro{sky, there was a lawful customs search which revealed the heroin in 
the defendant's package. The agents could have lawfully seized the heroin at that time, 
but instead placed a beeper inside the parcel. 581 F.2d at 210. In Brock, on the other 
hand, the DEA could not have legally seized the chemicals at the time they had posses-
sion since the chemicals were not illegal to possess at that time. 
61. Concerning consent, the court in Hufford stated that the chemical company 
could legally consent to the installation of the beeper since the defendant "did not have 
any reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment .... " 539 F.2d at 
34. 
62. See Matlock v. United States, 415 U.S. 164 (1964), which held that the consent 
by a third party requires a 'common authority' or 'joint access' over the object consented 
to. It would seem that the consent of the chemical company could not be considered 
within this rule since once it hands over the container, it no longer has any access or 
'common authority' over the container. See also United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 
943 (6th Cir. 1980), where the court rejected the consent to the installation by the prior 
owner as binding on the new owner. 
63. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964), in which the Supreme Court held 
that the consent of the hotel clerk to search the defendant's rented room violated the 
defendant's rights under the fourth amendment. The clerk had no authority to waive the 
defendant's rights, even though the defendant was only a renter. Id. at 489. 
64. The contention that since the drug in the container was to be used to manufac-
ture an illegal drug, it should be treated as contraband, is without merit. See United 
States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1980). As Bailey points out, if the item can later 
be used for illegal purposes, then it is that much easier to obtain a warrant. Id. at 944. 
65. See United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976). 
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ent treatment than that afforded homes and personal 
containers.88 Installing the beeper on an object which is in an 
area accessable to the public, or which travels on public space 
such as a highway, does not offend the Katz principles. How-
ever, to hold that a container in which a beeper is installed en-
joys no higher expectation of privacy than does an automobile 
obliterates the different degrees of protection accorded these 
objects.87 
A basic error in Judge Sneed's opinion was the faulty rea-
soning of the monitoring issue. He stated that property concepts 
have been abandoned by the Supreme Court in the search and 
seizure area.8S Judge Sneed then noted that a beeper attached to 
a container lacks sufficient physical contact with a defendant's 
personal items to be considered an encroachment upon the de-
fendant's privacy.89 However, one of the foundations of Katz is 
that the concept of privacy supplemented the traditional prop-
erty concepts rather than replacing it.70 Katz was a necessary 
answer to the increasing use of sophisticated electronic devices, 
and the ability to invade an individual's privacy without the 
66. The Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches of automobiles do not 
constitute a violation of the fourth amendment. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 
(1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 207 U.S. 132 
(1924). The Court has, on the other hand, recognized the difference between containers 
and automobiles, even' though containers may be found in automobiles. See United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), where the Court held that the warrantless search 
of defendant's footlocker seized from an automobile violated defendant's fourth amend-
ment rights. The Court stated that "a person's expectations of privacy in personal lug-
gage are substantially greater than in an automobile." 433 U.S. at 13. But see United 
States v. Ross, 50 U.S.L.W. 4580 (U.S. June 1, 1982), which limits the fourth amendment 
protections of containers found in automobiles during an automobile search. 
67. As the Supreme Court in Chadwick noted: "The factors which diminish the pri-
vacy aspects of an automobile do not apply to respondents' footlocker." 433 U.S. at 13. 
The Court in Cardwell upheld the warrantless scraping of paint samples from the defen-
dant's automobile. The Court noted the degree of difference between an automobile and 
one's personal effects or home, and stated: "One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a 
motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's resi-
dence or as the repository of personal effects." 417 U.S. at 590. 
68. 667 F.2d 1311, 1321. 
69. Id. This statement implies that the size of the beeper is to be a factor in deter-
mining whether or not there has been a search. . 
70. Katz did not overrule Silverman, supra note 8, which involved eavesdropping 
accomplished through the use of a device which physically penetrated the defendant's 
premise, though it did overrule Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1941), which 
held that if there is no physical trespass of the defendant's property, then there is no 
search. 
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user actually committing any form of trespass.7 • The Court in 
Katz considered the older property concepts necessary, but not 
sufficient, to protect individual rights against increasingly so-
phisticated electronic devices." In Brock, a technical trespass 
was committed when the defendants bought the chemicals arid 
unknowingly carried the beeper into their private residence. Be-
cause Katz expanded individual protections, while retaining 
property concepts, the court should have held that the trespass 
by the DEA constituted a search. 
Judge Sneed compared the monitoring of the beeper in 
Brock while it was in the defendants' house, to Dubrofsky, in 
which the surveillance occurred while the defendant was on pub-
lic roads. This comparison is misplaced for two reasons. First, in 
Dubrofsky, the beeper was placed in a package of heroin after a 
lawful customs search revealed the heroin. Since possession of 
heroin is illegal, there is no "reasonable" expectation of privacy, 
and the installation of a monitoring device and surveillance of 
the person holding the drug violates no protected rights. In 
Brock by contrast, the beeper was placed in a drug which was 
not illegal to possess. The contents of this container, like any 
other container without contraband, did not decrease the expec-
tation of privacy in its ownership. Thus, one of the predicates of 
Dubrofsky was not present in Brock. 
Second, the surveillance in Dubrofsky occurred while the 
automobile with the beeper was on a public highway. In Brock, 
the surveillance occurred while the beeper was inside a private 
residence. The Supreme Court has held that an automobile has 
a lesser expectation of privacy compared with that of a container 
or a home.78 Many lower courts have therefore inferred that a 
beeper placed on an automobile which is followed on public 
71. The Katz decision, above all else, necesaarily supplied the courts with a stan-
dard for dealing with electronic devices which were capable of invading an individual's 
privacy without actually tresp888ing on the person's property. Katz was not intended to 
substitute the Court's own belief concerning the expectation of the individual when the 
device actually trespasses upon the individual's property. 
72. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). In dealing with the issue of standing, 
the Court in Rakas stated that "by focusing on the legitimate expectation of privacy in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the court has not altogether abandoned use of prop-
erty concepts in determining the presence or absence of privacy interests protected by 
that Amendment." 439 U.S. at 144 n.12. See generally Note, Katz: Beepers, Privacy and 
the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE L.J. 1461 (1976). 
73. See supra notes 66, 67. 
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roads does not constitute a search. '14 Yet, it does not follow that 
the analysis applicable to automobiles can be applied to all 
forms of electronic monitoring. Tracking an automobile on pub-
lic roads and monitoring the location of a personal item are two 
different constitutionally protected categories, especially since 
the latter usually ends up in a home. Thus, the Ninth Circuit 
should have afforded defendants the degree of privacy expecta-
tion associated with personal articles and homes once the 
container was taken inside the defendants' residence. '111 
Also unsound was the court's comparison of a beeper with 
an ordinary sense-enhanced device. Though this comparison 
may be valid in certain situations, such as when the government 
is tracking an automobile on public roads, it is not reasonable 
when the beeper is located in a container carried into the home. 
The use of a trained dog, which relies on its senses to detect 
certain odors, is not comparable with a sophisticated electronic 
device which accompanies a person into his home.'16 The court 
considered a device which conveys any amount of information 
less than a wiretap as only a sense-enhancement device, and as 
such deserving of no fourth amendment protection surrounding 
its use.'1'1 
74. United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 
(1978); United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d at 1322 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
1046 (1977). But see United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en 
bane, 537 F.2d 227 (1976). 
75. The significance of this distinction cannot be stressed enough. Would a beeper 
attached to an individual's clothing be considered a search? If so, then would not attach-
ing a beeper on an item which an individual is likely to carry around with her be the 
same as direct attachment to her clothing? 
76. Ironically, the court in United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982), 
stated: "Generally, we have limited our exemption of the use of sense-enhancing devices 
... to cases in which ordinary, commercially available devices, which citizens might ex-
pect members of the general public as well as the law enforcement community to possess, 
are employed and their use occurs in a location from which the ordinary citizens might 
otherwise observe the property or activity. Clearly, the use of some sense-enhancing de-
vices may constitute a search." Id. at 1333 n.12. It is difficult to reconcile this statement 
with the court's holding in Brock. 
77. The court mistakenly relied on two Ninth Circuit cases. In Allen, a helicopter 
which flew over the defendant's house and used a telephoto lens was found not to be a 
search. The court noted that helicopters and airplanes repeatedly flew over the defen-
dant's house, that the telephoto lens only enhanced viewing of outdoor activity, and that 
the defendant's ranch was near the border. The court stated: "We are not presented with 
an attempt to reduce. . . the privacy expectations associated with interiors of residences 
or other structures." 633 F.2d 1282, 1289 (9th Cir. 1976). In United States v. Solis, 536 
F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976), a police dog legitimately on a road with public access smelled 
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Finally, the conclusion reached by the court undermines the 
two pronged analysis of Katz. The first prong of the test, the 
subjective aspect of the expectation of privacy, focuses on the 
person's objective actions manifesting an increased expectation 
of privacy. With the beeper however, its undetectability renders 
this aspect of the test unnecessary since the person being moni-
tored is usually unaware of the beeper's presence. Unlike the 
pen register in Smith v. Maryland,78 when a beeper is attached 
to an individual or his personal articles, that person is unable to 
manifest his increased expectation of privacy. Unless the indi-
vidual discovers and destroys the beeper, he cannot otherwise 
exhibit any subjective expectation of privacy even though he 
may be in the privacy of his home. The individual is unable to 
take steps to protect his privacy, and the infringement caused by 
the installation and monitoring of a beeper is not, under Brock, 
one which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. This 
comes close to a determination that the use of beepers is per se 
reasonable. As electronic devices become more sophisticated, 
thus less detectable, and play a greater role in police practice, 
the threat to individual privacy grows. Accordingly, it is neces-
sary for the judiciary to assert a more aggressive role in protect-
ing individuals against such invasions. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Classification of the use of a beeper as a search would not 
outlaw its use, nor would it curtail its effectiveness. When wire-
taps were classified as a search under Katz, law enforcement 
agencies used the judicial process to secure a warrant. This 
placed control on the unrestrained usage of an electronic device 
which had the potential to seriously invade the privacy of indi-
viduals in society. Likewise, as electronic devices become even 
more sophisticated and intrusive, there is an increased necessity 
drugs from the road and thereby tipped off the police of the location of drugs inside the 
defendant's trailer. The court stated that the use of the dog wae not a search under the 
plain view doctrine. Ironically, the court noted that "[n]o sophisticated mechanical or 
electronic devices were used." 536 F.2d at 882. In both these caees, the court made no 
attempt to draw a comparison between the facts presented and the usage of any form of 
an electronic device. If anything, these decisions seem to back away from such an idea 
and rely on the plain view doctrine. It is illogical that the court in Brock would rely on 
these two holdings in order to 88Bociate the beeper with an ordinary sense enhancement 
device. 
78. 442 U.S. 347 (1979). 
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for some restraint on their use.79 Classification of the use of 
beepers as a search would not hamper their usage; it would only 
curtail their abuse. 
William M. Audet· 
NINTH CIRCUIT ADOPTS PRESUMPTION OF 
PREJUDICE STANDARD FOR INTERNALLY TAINTED 
JURY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Shapiro, l the Ninth Circuit held that a 
strong presumption of prejudice arises whenever a taint 
originates within the jury itself. This presumption is rebuttable 
and no mistrial required if the government shows that the de-
fendant was not prejudiced. In this case, the court ruled that a 
mistrial should have been granted because the government had 
not met its burden of proof. II A concurring opinion advocated 
adopting a narrower rule focusing on whether the defendant re-
ceived a fair trial without invoking the presumption of 
prejudice. 8 
The defendants were convicted of possession of and conspir-
acy to possess cocaine, with intent to distribute.· During the 
trial, the defendant's husband, himself a co-defendant, and her 
mother-in-law received several phone calls from a man offering 
79. See Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 241, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 
(1975). The California Supreme Court recognized that: 
Development of . . . sophisticated instruments have acceler-
ated the ability of government to intrude into areas which a 
person normally chooses to exclude from prying eyes and in-
quisitive minds. Consequently, judicial interpretations of the 
reach of the constitutional protection of individual privacy 
. must keep pace with the perils created by these new devices. 
13 Cal. 3d at 248, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172. 
• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. 669 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Norris, J., the other panel members were Nel-
son, J. and Skopil, J., concurring). 
2. rd. at 602-03. 
3. rd. at 603-05. 
4. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(I), 846 (1976). 
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/10
1983] CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 193 
an acquittal in exchange for 15,000 dollars. An investigation re-
vealed one of the jurors to be the extortionist. & The juror was 
immediately removed from the trial, without explanation to the 
other jurors. The defendants unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial 
on the ground that the jury had been tainted. The court denied 
the motion, and over objections from defense counsel, conducted 
a voir dire to determine whether the other jurors had been 
tainted.8 As a result of the juror's unexplained removal, followed 
by the voir dire, several of the jurors began to suspect that the 
dismissal was the product of misconduct by one of the parties.' 
5. Two Drug Enforcement Agency agents posed as messenger service employees to 
deliver the money. When the juror arrived to pick up the money he was arrested. 669 
F.2d at 599. 
6. Each juror was asked: (1) if he or his family had been contacted by anyone about 
the case; (2) if another juror had discussed the case with him; (3) if he had discussed the 
case with him; (4) if he had discussed the case with any other juror; (5) if anything had 
happened to influence his impartiality; (6) if he had heard other jurors discuBBing the 
case; (7) if he thought that the voir dire was occasioned by out-of-court misconduct by 
defense or prosecution; and, (8) if anything had occurred which might cause an unfair 
verdict. [d. 
7. The voir dire questions and responses included the following: 
THE COURT: Do you think this questioning has been occa-
sioned by any out-of-court misconduct by the prosecution or 
any of the defendants? 
JUROR CHUMLEY: Now this is what I should have 
been-normally would have been thinking about during lunch 
and everything, but we had a large lunch and we have been 
playing cards and I really had not thought about it. 
THE COURT: I am just planting thoughts in your mind, huh? 
JUROR CHUMLEY: In a sense, yes. 
THE COURT: Do you have any idea or suspicion about the 
reason for this questioning? 
JUROR MALONEY: No, I have to admit it seemed-I was 
curious in my own mind as to why, because it is probably not 
the normal. It probably does not happen in most cases. 
THE COURT: Do you have any idea or suspicion about the 
reason for this questioning of you? 
JUROR PATTERSON: No. I was alarmed about it yesterday 
because I could tell you were upset and it apparently was one 
of the jurors, and I didn't know what was behind all that. 
THE COURT: Which juror would that have been that you 
thought I might have been upset about? 
JUROR PATTERSON: That would have been Joe, the tall 
man. [Joe Leoni was the juror removed for attempted 
extortion]. 
THE COURT: Do you think this questioning has been occa-
sioned by any out-of-court misconduct by the prosecution or 
any of the defendants? 
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The trial court concluded that the voir dire did not show evi-
dence of any prejudice to the defendants, and denied the second 
motion for mistrial. The subsequent convictions were appealed 
on the grounds, inter alia, that a mistrial should have been 
declared.s 
B. BACKGROUND 
While there is no precedent for dealing with a juror's at-
tempted extortion of funds from a defendant, many cases have 
dealt with juries tainted by outside influences. From these cases, 
two standards have emerged to determine when a mistrial is re-
quired. The first standard was espoused by the Supreme Court 
in Mattox v. United States,9 the second by the Ninth Circuit in 
Cavness v. United States. 10 
In Mattox, during a trial for murder, a court official told the 
deliberating jury that this trial was the defendant's second trial 
for murder. The defendant was subsequently convicted. The Su-
preme Court reversed, stating that "[p]rivate communications, 
possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third persons, or wit-
nesses, or the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden, and in-
validate the verdict, at least unless their harmlessness is made to 
JUROR PATTERSON: I can't say, Judge, one way or the 
other on that. 
THE COURT: Do you think this questioning has been occa-
sioned by any out-of-court misconduct by the prosecution or 
any of the defendants? 
JUROR MATT: I wouldn't know about that. 
THE COURT: Do you think this questioning has been occa-
sioned by any out-of-court misconduct by the prosecution or 
any of the defendants? 
JUROR ANDERSON: Now repeat that over again. 
THE COURT: (Repeats question) 
JUROR ANDERSON: Yes, I think there is. 
Id. at 601-02. 
8. The other grounds for appeal were that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to con-
vict; (2) the defendant was under dureBB; (3) the evidence to show predisposition of a co-
defendant was improper; (4) the jury should have been instructed on entrapment; and, 
(5) defense counsel should have been allowed to question a government witneBB in cam-
era to determine if there was a Massiah violation. The Ninth Circuit rejected all of these 
arguments. Id. at 595-98. 
9. 146 U.S. 140 (1892). 
10. 187 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1951). 
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appear."ll Any unauthorized contact with the jury necessitates a 
mistrial unless the prosecution can show that the contact did 
not induce any prejudice. 
The Supreme Court broadened its reading of Mattox in 
Remmer v. United States I2 by recognizing that indirect influ-
ences could also seriously prejudice a jury. The Court held that 
any improper contact, direct or indirect, would raise a presump-
tion of prejudice, placing a heavy burden of rebuttal upon the 
government. IS In Remmer, the fact that the FBI investigated a 
juror during the trial was held sufficient to raise a presumption 
of prejudice.14 
Both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have adopted this line of 
reasoning. In Stone v. United States,l11 the voir dire of only 
eleven of the twelve jurors was held sufficient to raise a pre-
sumption of prejudice, requiring a hearing where the affected ju-
ror was the one not questioned. I8 In United States v. Fergu-
son,17 a juror was dismissed for having discussed the case with 
friends of the defendant. No explanation for this dismissal was 
given to the other jurors. The Sixth Circuit held that removal of 
the tainted juror before deliberations did not eliminate the pre-
11. 146 u.s. at 150. 
12. 347 U.S. 227 (1954). During defendant's trial for federal income tax evasion, an 
unidentified person attempted to bribe one of the jurors. The judge and prosecution were 
notified of the attempt. The FBI investigated the jurors during the trial, and issued a 
report which the judge and prosecutor considered in concluding that there was no evi-
dence of bribery. None of the jurors were dismissed. The defendant learned of the at-
tempt only after his conviction. [d. at 228. 
[d. 
13. [d. at 229. 
14. The Court stated: 
The sending of an F.B.I. agent in the midst of a trial to inves-
tigate a juror as to his conduct is bound to impress the juror 
and is very apt to do so unduly. A juror must feel free to exer-
cise his functions without the F.B.I. or anyone else looking 
over his shoulder. 
15. 113 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1940). During defendant's trial for securities fraud, a third 
party attempted to bribe a juror. The trial court conducted a voir dire of the other ju-
rors, asking if anything had occurred which had prejudiced them. The contacted juror 
was neither questioned nor dismissed. [d. at 76. 
16. [d. at 77. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the other jurors might suspect that 
the twelfth juror was tainted when he alone was not subjected to voir dire. 
17. 486 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1973). The defendant was tried for using the United 
States mail to defraud certain banks. 
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sumption of prejudice. I8 
The Fifth Circuit has adopted the American Bar Associa-
tion's proposed guidelines for conducting a hearing to determine 
the presence of taint in the jury.I9 The guidelines require that 
the trial judge question each juror separately in the presence of 
counsel. This inquiry is aimed at revealing how much contact 
each juror had with the outside influence, and how much 
prejudice resulted.20 
A second approach, adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Cav-
ness,21 relies on the trial judge's discretion to insure a fair trial 
instead of analyzing the taint in terms of a rebuttable presump-
tion of prejudice. This approach is based on the belief that the 
trial court is better able to judge whether defendant's trial was 
prejudiced by direct observation of the jury. It is then for the 
court to decide what action, if any, is necessary to protect the 
defendant's right to a fair trial. Consequently, the trial court is 
reversed only for abusing its discretion. 
Several Ninth Circuit cases demonstrate the application of 
this approach. In United States v. Klee,22 eleven of the fourteen 
jurors and alternates discussed the defendant's guilt before de-
liberation. The defendant was convicted, and his motion for mis-
trial denied. In upholding the conviction, the Ninth Circuit 
stated that not all incidents of juror misconduct require a mis-
trial; the ultimate question is whether or not the trial was fair.2s 
In United States v. Hendrix,24 the Ninth Circuit found that the 
18. [d. at 972. Two possibilities for prejudice existed. First, the contacted juror may 
have influenced the rest of the jury before he was removed. Alternatively, the jury might 
have suspected that the unexplained dismissal was occasioned by out-of-court miscon-
duct by the defendant. [d. at 971-72. 
19. United States v. Herring, 568 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Forrest, 
620 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1980). In Herring, defendant was convicted of supplying illegal 
drugs. The Fifth Circuit reversed because the jurors had read newspaper articles stating 
that a witness's life had been threatened. [d. at 1100. 
20. 568 F.2d at 1106. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 
§ 3.6(0 (1980). 
21. 187 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1951). Defendant was on trial for purchasing cocaine and 
heroin. During deliberation, a juror left and made two phone calls, accompanied by a 
federal marshall. Defendant's motion for mistrial was denied, and he was subsequently 
convicted. [d. at 723. 
22. 494 F.2d 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974). 
23. 494 F.2d at 396. 
24. 549 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 960 
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trial court's procedure of accepting affidavits in lieu of a hearing 
was less than "ideal," but affirmed because that procedure came 
within the trial court's discretion.2 l! 
The Ninth Circuit attempted to reconcile its position with 
the Remmer and Mattox standards in the case of United States 
v. Armstrong.26 The court compared the two approaches and 
then concluded that the same result is obtained regardless of 
which standard is employed, since both are designed to insure 
the fairness of the trial. 27 
In the recent case of Smith v. Phillips,28 the Supreme Court 
rejected the defendant's argument for an "implied bias" or "con-
clusive presumption" of prejudice. The Court stated that "the 
remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which 
the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias."119 This 
approach is not consistent with Remmer, which placed the bur-
(1977). Defendant was indicted for transporting illegal aliens and conspiracy to transport 
illegal aliens. Before trial, one of the jurors made statements showing a predisposition to 
convict. Defendant's wife and her mother witnessed these statements, and informed de-
fense counsel. Defense counsel informed the court and requested an investigation. The 
request was denied. The court accepted affidavits from the defendant's wife and her 
mother, both of which quoted the juror as saying 
[W]e just had a case where a policewoman was tried for selling 
narcotics and the damn Judge let her go. And she was abso-
lutely guilty. And I am here to see that they put some of these 
people away. These Judges are absolutely too lenient and they 
are letting too many people run around. 
549 F.2d at 1227. 
25. Id. at 1229. 
26. 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1032 (1982). While defen-
dant was on trial for fraud, one of the jurors told the court that her husband had re-
ceived two phone calls which said, "Tell your wife to stop hassling my brother-in-law at 
court." The court took no action, and the defendant was convicted. 654 F.2d at 1331. 
27. The court stated: "[H]aving been presented with facts establishing a jury irregu-
larity, whether or not we speak in terms of the rebuttable presumption of prejudice or of 
the fairness of the defendant's trial, we reach the same result." Id. at 1332. 
28. 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982). During defendant's trial for murder, one of the jurors 
applied for a job with the district attorney. The defense was not informed of this until 
after the defendant's conviction. The trial court conducted a post-conviction hearing and 
concluded that the juror's application had no effect on the verdict. The appellate divi-
sion affirmed without opinion, and the court of appeals denied leave to appeal. The dis-
trict court reviewed the case on habeas corpus and found insufficient evidence to show 
that the juror was biased, but held that bias should be implied under the circumstances. 
The Second Circuit affirmed on the grounds that the prosecutorial misconduct had de-
nied the defendant due process. The Supreme Court rejected both arguments, and held 
that it was error for the district court to order a new trial. Id. at 943-44. 
29. Id. at 943-44. 
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den of rebutting the existence of prejudice on the prosecution. 
Thus, Smith indicates the Court's willingness to cut back on 
Remmer. 3o 
C. THE COURT'S REASONING 
The Majority 
The Shapiro court first rejected the government's argument 
that Remmer was inapplicable because, unlike Remmer, the 
tainted juror was removed. Instead, the court adopted the 
broader reading of Remmer as applied in Ferguson, that the re-
moval of the tainted juror does not conclusively remove the pre-
sumption of prejudice.31 The Shapiro court also recognized that 
the juror might have influenced other jurors before his re-
moval. 32 The court found that this was highly probable, as the 
juror had promised an acquittal rather than just a hung jury, 
and had a list of the other jurors' names and their cities of resi-
dence when he was arrested. During voir dire, several jurors in-
dicated that there had been casual conversations about the de-
fendant. 33 For these reasons, the court refused to take at face 
value the jurors' statements that these conversations had been 
innocuous.34 
The court also reasoned that the juror's unexplained dismis-
sal followed by questioning concerning misconduct by the par-
ties,311 might have led the jury to suspect that the defendant was 
guilty of some out-of-court misconduct.38 After examining the 
trial record, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the government 
failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, particularly in light 
of one of the juror's statement that she felt the voir dire was 
occasioned by misconduct by one of the parties.37 As a trial is 
unfair if even a single juror is improperly influenced, the court 
30. The concurrence and dissent in Smith stated that this case should not be read 
as foreclosing any future use of implied bias. [d. at 948, 955. 
31. 669 F.2d at 599. 
32. [d. at 600. 
33. See responses of Jurors Chumley, Maloney, Hutchins and Patterson, id. at 600-
01. 
34. [d. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1961); United States v. Brown, 571 
F.2d 980, 991 (6th Cir. 1978). 
35. 669 F.2d at 600. 
36. [d. S"c supra note 8. 
37. See statement of Juror Anderson, supra note 7. 
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held that a mistrial should have been granted. 
The court emphasized that it was not propounding a per se 
rule. Rather, as a general proposition, the prosecution should 
have the opportunity to prove lack of prejudice. In this case 
however, the evidence of prejudice was incontrovertable.38 
The Concurrence 
Judge Skopil asserted that the abuse of discretion standard 
should have been applied in this case. Relying on Armstrong, 
the concurrence argued that the key inquiry in jury taint cases is 
whether the fairness of defendant's trial has been prejudiced. 
The trial judge is in the best position to make this determina-
tion, therefore deference should be given to that decision.39 
The concurrence also argued that this view is supported by 
recent Fifth and Sixth Circuit cases,·o and concluded that in this 
case a mistrial was required because the voir dire responses re-
vealed that defendant did not receive a fair trial.41 
D. SIGNIFICANCE 
The sixth amendment right to a fair trial is the defendant's 
"most priceless" right.u When juror taint is alleged, the problem 
presented is how best to protect that right. A per se rule requir-
ing a mistrial each time a defendant had grounds to suspect ju-
ror bias would be the strongest safeguard since there would be 
little chance of receiving a prejudiced trial. However, such a rule 
is overinclusive, because it requires a mistrial even when lack of 
prejudice can be shown. 
The abuse of discretion approach avoids the overinclusive-
ness of the per se rule, but is fraught with other difficulties. The 
38. 669 F.2d at 603. The court also stated that its research uncovered no other cases 
where a juror attempted to extort money for a favorable verdict. "Happily, it should be 
extremely rare for a trial court to again be confronted with a motion for mistrial based 
on such unusual circumstances as occurred in this case." Id. 
39. Id. See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1032 (1982). 
40. See United States v. Forrest, 620 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd after remand, 
649 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1978); 
United States v. Ferguson, 486 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1981). 
41. 669 F.2d at 605. 
42. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721. 
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Supreme Court has recognized that juror bias can be extremely 
difficult or impossible to prove.43 A juror may strenuously and in 
good faith deny being biased, yet still be unconsciously influ-
enced.44 If the juror has acted with conscious bias, he may be 
subject to criminal penalties if he cannot conceal his motives.4& 
In addition to this problem of proof, the defendant faces the 
difficulty of convincing the trial judge who is aware of the cost 
involved in retrying the case, and who may be predisposed to 
rule in the interests of judicial economy. The judge may also be 
reluctant to grant a mistrial, as the need for a mistrial reflects 
upon her ability to conduct a fair trial. Ideally, no judge should 
consider judicial economy or her own reputation above the de-
fendant's constitutional right to a fair trial, but the possibility 
nevertheless exists. 
If the defendant cannot obtain a mistrial from the trial 
court, he is confronted with an appellate court that will reverse 
only for a "clear abuse of discretion."46 Appellate courts are re-
luctant to reverse under this standard and as a result, the defen-
dant may be denied even a hearing.47 Far from guaranteeing the 
defendant a fair trial, this approach places an almost insur-
mountable burden on the defendant to protect his constitution-
ally guaranteed right to a fair trial. 
The Remmer approach, as adopted by the Shapiro court, 
reflects a middle ground between the overly inclusive per se rule 
and the "fair trial" approach. By raising a rebuttable presump-
tion of prejudice when there is evidence of possible jury taint, 
the court lifts from the defendant the onerous burden of proof 
required under the abuse of discretion standard. If taint can 
neither be proven nor disproven, a mistrial is declared, thus pro-
tecting the defendant's rights. In this respect, this rule affords as 
much protection as the per se rule. However, the Remmer ap-
proach is less wasteful than the per se rule because it does not 
require a mistrial when the government can show that there was 
no actual prejudice. While the Remmer approach may result in 
43. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909). 
44. Smith, 102 S. Ct. at 953. 
45. [d. at 952. 
46. 669 F.2d at 605. 
47. See, e.g., United States v. Hendrix, supra note 24. 
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more mistrials than the "fair trial" approach, it more fully pro-
tects the defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury by elimi-
nating from consideration any question of judicial economy. 
A major fault of the Shapiro decision is that Remmer is not 
applied more broadly. The court specified that the Remmer pro-
cedure would be applied only in cases when the taint originates 
from within the jury,'lS Therefore, the Ninth Circuit now has two 
standards; the Remmer approach if the alleged taint originates 
within the jury, and the "fair trial" standard for cases in which 
the taint originates outside the jury. In Shapiro, there was both 
internal taint from the extortionist, and external taint from the 
trial court's voir dire. The court could therefore have used this 
situation to apply Remmer to all cases of jury taint. Shapiro 
may serve as precedent for such an extension in the future. 
Grant D. Green· 
BROADENING THE SHIELD OF MASSIAH TO POST-
TRIAL CONFESSIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Cahill v. Rushen,t the Ninth Circuit was presented with 
an issue of first impression: whether the Massiah doctrine ap-
plies to a confession given after conviction and sentencing in a 
first trial, which is then admitted at a retrial. The court con-
cluded that if the defendant was not afforded an opportunity to 
consult with his attorney, such incriminating statements are to 
be excluded at a subsequent trial on charges for which the de-
fendant was originally indicted.2 
Petitioner Cahill was arrested in 1972 for suspicion of mur-
48. The court stated that "we do not adopt a per se rule requiring that a mistrial be 
declared whenever jury taint originates from within the jury itself." 669 F.2d at 603 
(emphasis added). 
• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. 678 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Schroeder, J.; the other panel members were 
Henderson, D. J., sitting by designation, and Wallace, J., dissenting). 
2. 1d. at 795. 
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der in connection with the death of an accomplice in a bank for~ 
gery scheme. Prior to his first trial, he was interviewed four 
times by Captain Carter, a county sheriff.3 The fourth interview 
took place on the day Cahill was indicted and, unlike the prior 
meetings, he was not apprised of his Miranda'" rights. Ii During , 
this interview, Cahill agreed to tell Carter, at the conclusion of 
his trial, what had transpired at the scene of the homicide.6 
Cahill was tried and convicted of murder. The day after his 
conviction, Captain Carter had Cahill brought to his office from 
out of custody at the nearby jail.' Thereupon Cahill made a 
complete confession.s Carter did not allow Cahill to consult with 
an attorney, did not read him his Miranda rights, and did not 
inform Cahill's attorney that the meeting was to take place.s 
Since he had already been convicted, Cahill believed that his 
confession could have no adverse consequences. lO 
The conviction was subsequently reversed on grounds unre~ 
lated to the confession.ll Cahill was retried under the original 
indictment, and upon retrial, the confession was admitted into 
evidence. The second trial also resulted in a conviction, and af~ 
3. Id. at 792. 
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
5. 678 F.2d at 792. Prior to the fourth meeting, petitioner expressed a desire to be 
represented by counsel, but was not so provided. At the last meeting "[Cahill) again 
informed Carter that he was not represented by counsel and desired at least one, possi-
bly two attorneys, to handle his case but, as was the case during all of the interviews, he 
did not request the presence of an attorney." Cahill v. Rushen, 501 F. Supp. 1219, 1221 
(E.n. Cal. 1980). ' 
6. Judge Wallace related the grisly details of the murder: "The victim was stabbed 
fifteen times in the body and struck in the head eighteen times with a blunt instrument. 
According to the testimony of [an) eyewitness ... these wounds were inflicted by Cahill 
with a butcher knife and claw hammer." 678 F.2d at 796 n.l. 
7. Id. at 796-97. Cahill had waived preparation of a presentence report and was sen-
tenced immediately after conviction. Id. at 796. 
8. ld. at 796. 
9. Id. at 793. 
10. "According to Carter, Cahill indicated during the conversation that he was will-
ing to talk because his statements 'probably would not be admissible in a later trial.' " 
Id. at 797. 
11. The reversal was based on an erroneous omission of a jury instruction. People v. 
Cahill, 3 Crim. 6850 (Oct. 29, 1974) (unpublished opinion). The appellate court relied on 
People v. Gordon, 10 Cal. 3d 460, 516 P.2d 298, 110 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1973), in which the 
California Supreme Court ruled that when the evidence indicates that a crime might 
have been committed by either the witness or the defendant, although not necessarily by 
both parties, the jury must be given an accomplice instruction. 10 Cal. 3d at 468-69, 516 
P.2d at 307, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 915. 
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ter exhausting state remedies,12 Cahill petitioned for a federal 
writ of habeas corpus,13 alleging violations of his rights under 
the fifth and sixth amendments.14 The district court granted the 
petition, finding that Cahill's sixth amendment right to counsel 
had been violated and that the confession to Captain Carter 
should have been excluded at the second trial. 1Ii 
B. BACKGROUND 
The sixth amendment right to counseP6 is recognized as one 
of the most important procedural rights available to a criminal 
defendant. 17 It affords him critical support when confronted 
with the prosecutorial power of the state18 and prevents him 
from having to stand alone against this power without aid in his 
defense.19 While initially the right guaranteed representation by 
counsel only at trial itself,20 it has since been expanded to en-
compass certain pretrial events.21 The purpose of this expansion 
12. The California courts, relying on Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) held 
that Cahill's confession was not "deliberately elicited" because there had been no "inter-
rogation". But see United States v. Henry, 477 U.S. 264, 271 (1980) (interrogation not 
necessary to satisfy the "deliberately elicted" test). See also Kamisar, Brewer v. Wil-
liams, Massiah and Miranda: What is "Interrogation''? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. 
L.J. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Interrogation). 
13. The petition was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). 
14. Cahill also raised the issue of improper comment by the prosecution in violation 
of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). The issue was never addressed because of the sixth 
amendment findings. 501 F. Supp. at 1231. 
15. 501 F. Supp. at 1232. 
16. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence" U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
17. The dissent in Cahill stated: 
It does not belittle the other constitutional rights enjoyed by 
criminal defendants to state that this right to counsel is per-
haps the most important of all. Otherwise, the basic integrity 
of our criminal justice system would be suspect. Were the 
state able to marshal its formidable resources against those ac-
cused of committing crimes and force them to stand alone 
while their life and liberty is in jeopardy, there could be no 
assurance that those sent to prison were indeed guilty of the 
offenses charged. 
678 F.2d at 799. 
18. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. I, 7 (1970). 
19. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225 (1967). 
20. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973). 
21. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary examinations); United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (post-indictment lineups); White v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 59 (1963) (preliminary hearings); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (certain 
arraignments). See also infra note 26. 
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has been to guarantee representation in those "pretrial events 
that might appropriately be considered to be parts of the trial 
itself. "12 
The Supreme Court has determined that the right to coun-
sel attaches once formal adversarial proceedings have begun/as 
which is generally at the time of arraignment or indictment/a. 
once the formal "prosecution"lIa of the defendant has com-
menced. After this "attachment", the right is applicable to "any 
and all subsequent 'critical stages' of the prosecution where the 
presence of counsel is necessary to protect the fairness of the 
trial itself."IB However, defining those events which should be 
considered "parts of the trial," and therefore a "critical stage" in 
the prosecution, has been a controversial task. I? 
The Supreme Court in United States u. Ash28 found that to 
constitute a "critical stage" the lawyer's pretrial role must be 
essentially the same as his function at trial.le The three criteria 
necessary to make this determination are: (1) whether the ab-
sence of counsel creates the possibility of unfairness in the sub-
22. Ash. 413 U.S. at 310. 
23. Brewer. 430 U.S. at 401. See Traynor. The Devils of Due Process in Criminal 
Detection, Detention. and Trial. 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 657. 673 (1966). 
24. 430 U.S. at 401. 
25. Kirby v. minois. 406 U.S. 682. 688-89 (1972). 
26. 678 F.2d at 800. A retrospective analysis is nece88ary to determine whether the 
confrontation was in fact "critical." See. e.g .• Coleman v. Alabama. 399 U.S. 1 (1970) 
(preliminary hearing is a critical stage because it could have a prejudicial effect on the 
trial); United States v. Wade. 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (line-up is a critical stage so as to 
insure that the trial will be fair); White v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (preliminary 
hearing is a critical stage to insure intelligent pleading by the defendant); Hamilton v. 
Alabama. 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (arraignment is a critical stage because what happens there 
could have effect on trial); Crooker v. California. 357 U.S. 433 (1958) (if a pretrial pro-
ceeding without counsel would substantially prejudice the defendant at trial. then the 
right to counsel attaches at that proceeding); Powell v. Alabama. 287 U.S. 45 (1932) 
(some pretrial stages are as critical as the trial itself). But see United States v. Ash. 413 
U.S. 300 (1973) (photo display is not a critical stage); Kirby v. minois. 406 U.S. 682 
(1972) (preindictment showup is not a critical stage because formal proceedings against 
the defendant have not been initiated); United States v. Wade. 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (tak-
ing of blood and fingerprints are not critical stages); Gilbert v. California. 388 U.S. 263 
(1967) (handwriting exemplar is Dot a critical stage because there is only a minimal 
chance that it will make the trial unfair). 
27. See, e.g .• Snead v. Stringer. 454 U.S. 988. 989 (1981) (Rehnquist. J .• dissenting 
from denial of certiorari); Brewer v. Williams. 430 U.S. 387. 398 (1977). 
28. 413 U.S. 300 (1973). 
29. [d. at 309. 
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sequent trial,30 (2) whether the court has an opportunity at trial 
to cure any defect created by the absence of counsel in the post-
indictment confrontation,31 and (3) whether the nature of the 
confrontation is such that the attorney would be functioning as 
a legal assistant, helping the defendant with his legal problems.32 
The Massiah Doctrine 
Certain pretrial dialogues between government agents and 
defendants against whom formal adversarial proceedings have 
been initiated are considered "critical stages" in the prosecution 
of a defendant, and therefore within the purview of the sixth 
amendment right to counsel. In Massiah v. United States,33 the 
defendant, after his indictment and release on bail, made in-
criminating statements to an alleged co-conspirator, who was 
acting as a government agent. The defendant's statements were 
surreptitiously recorded by the police.3• The Supreme Court 
held that the defendant "was denied the basic protections of 
[the sixth amendment] guarantee [of right to counsel] when 
there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own in-
criminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited 
from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his 
counsel."311 The rule in Massiah was subsequently interpreted to 
require three elements: (1) deliberate elicitation of statements 
by government agents; (2) after indictment or the initiation of 
30. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 315-16 (1973); United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218, 227 (1967); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964); Hamilton v. Alabama, 
368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961). 
31. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 315-16 (1973); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 
1, 9-11 (1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). 
32. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 313 (1973); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218, 226 (1967). 
33. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). It was not until Massiah that the courts began relying di-
rectly on the sixth amendment in right to counsel cases. All previous decisions had relied 
on the due process clause of the fourteentlI amendment. See P. LEwIs & K. PEOPLES, 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 420 (1979). 
34. The defendant, a merchant seaman, and his confederate, were arrested and in-
dicted for possession of narcotics after government agents found three and a half pounds 
of cocaine aboard tlIeir vessel. Mter both were released on bail, the confederate agreed to 
cooperate witlI the government agents and assist them in their investigation. Equipped 
with a radio transmitter in his car, the confederate engaged in a conversation with the 
defendant during the course of which he elicited incriminating information. 377 U.S. at 
203. Subsequently, the Court noted that the fact that the statements were surreptitiously 
recorded was "constitutionally irrelevant." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 400 (1977). 
35. 377 U.S. at 206. 
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adversarial proceedings; (3) in the absence of counse}.36 
The import of Massiah was overshadowed by the decision in 
Miranda two years later and the latter case's focus on the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. However in 1978, the Supreme 
Court, in Brewer v. Williams,S? demonstrated the vitality of the 
Massiah doctrine. In Brewer, the Court held that because adver-
sarial proceedings had begun, the defendant had a right to legal 
representation when the government interrogated him.S8 Al-
though the fifth amendment potentially applied, the Court chose 
to exclude defendant's confession under the sixth amendment, 
thereby affirming the principle set forth in Massiah. 
Recent Supreme Court cases have verified the endurance of 
Massiah both as doctrine distinct from the fifth amendment Mi-
randa principles and as a major protection afforded the ac-
cused.s8 In Rhode Island v. Innis,40 the COlJrt noted that while 
Miranda is concerned with "custodial interrogation," Massiah 
focuses on "deliberate elicitation" once formal adversarial pro-
ceedings have begun.41 The Court explained that the policies un-
derlying the two constitutional protections are "quite distinct."42 
Though Innis was decided on Miranda grounds,48 the Court re-
affirmed Massiah by clarifying that separate analyses are neces-
sary under the fifth and sixth amendments. 44 
36. Brewer, 430 U.S. 387,401. 
37. 430 U.S. 387 (1978). 
38. In Brewer, the defendant W88 transported to another city by two officers in a 
police car after being indicted for murder. During the trip, he W88 subjected to what h88 
become known 88 the "Christian Burial speech" by one of the officers. The "interroga- . 
tion" caused the defendant to reveal the location of the victim's body. Defendant's sub-
sequent conviction W88 reversed by the Supreme Court because his right to counsel had 
been violated. 430 U.S. at 400-01. That the Court analyzed Brewer in terms of the sixth 
amendment, and did not deem Miranda applicable, demonstrated the revitalization of 
the Massiah rule. For comment on the Court's use of the term "interrogation," see Inter-
rogation, supra note 12. 
39. See Note, Sixth Amendment-M88siah Revitalized, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 601 (1980) [hereinafter cited 88 M88siah Revitalized]. 
40. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
41. 446 U.S. at 300 n.4. See White, Rhode Island v. Innis: The Significance of a 
Suspect's Assertion of his Right to Counsel, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 53 (1980). 
42. 446 U.S. at 300 n.4. The Miranda rule applies only where the defendant is in 
"custody" and is subject to "interrogation". Both elements have proven difficult to 
define. 
43. Id. at 298. 
44. See Rhode Island v. Innis: A Fifth Amendment Case With Sixth Amendment 
Implications, 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 339, 345 (1980-81). 
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In United States v. Henry,4& incriminating statements ob-
tained through a jailhouse informant paid on a contingency fee 
by the government were used to convict the defendant.48 By in-
tentionally creating a situation "likely to induce" the indicted 
defendant to make incriminating statements in the absence of 
counsel, the government elicited the confession in violation of 
the defendant's rights guaranteed under Massiah.47 The "likely 
to induce" test thus established a new standard for determining 
whether incriminating statements have been "deliberately elic-
ited."48 The Henry decision attests to the viability of Massiah 
and, in addition, to the Court's commitment to further define 
the elements of Massiah in order that it can be effectively 
applied.49 
C. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The broad issue facing the Cahill court was whether the pe-
titioner's sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated 
during his post-trial conversation to Captain Carter.&O Though 
the members of the panel agreed that all of the elements of 
Massiah were present,&l they disagreed on whether the sixth 
45. 447 U.S. 264 (1980). 
46. A fellow inmate of the defendant was told to pay attention to statements made 
by the defendant or any other prisoners but not to initiate any of the conversations. 
After his release the informant reported that the defendant had made incriminating 
statements regarding a bank robbery. These statements were admitted into evidence at 
the defendant's trial. Id. at 266-67. 
47. Id. at 273-74. The Court cited three factors to determine whether a sixth amend-
ment violation had occurred: (1) whether the government paid and instructed the in-
formant; (2) whether the informant was a fellow inmate; and, (3) whether the defendant 
was indicted. Id. 
48. See Note, United States v. Henry: The Further Expansion of the Criminal De-
fendant's Right to Counsel During Interrogations, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 451 (1981). 
49. See Massiah Revitalized, supra note 39, at 604. The author expreSBes the view 
that case by case applications in the lower courts would be neceSBarY to establish guide-
lines to determine when particular governmental conduct violates a defendant's sixth 
amendment right to counsel. The creation of the objective "likely to induce" test indi-
cates a willingneSB on the part of the Court to find a violation of Massiah rather than a 
violation of Miranda utilizing a similar test. Id. 
50. 678 F.2d at 793. 
51. The court stated: 
At the time of the confeSBion Cahill had been arrested, ar-
raigned, and indicted; thus, the right to counsel clearly had 
attached . . . . The confeSBion was 'deliberately elicited' by 
Captain Carter, as the state properly conceded at oral argu-
ment. Finally, it is undisputed that Cahill's counsel was not 
only absent, but completely unaware that the meeting was to 
45
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amendment was applicable to a confession obtained after both 
conviction and sentencing. 
The Majority 
In the majority's view, the single issue presented by Cahill 
was whether the timing of the confession affected its admissibil-
ity.1I2 The petitioner's right to counsel had clearly attached since 
he had originally been arrested, arraigned, and indicted, and all 
of the elements of Massiah were met.1I3 The majority noted that 
though his confession occurred before his first appeal, the peti-
tioner was not asserting any right to counsel in connection with 
an appeal from his first triap· Rather, petitioner was com-
plaining of the admission of his confession at the second trial. 
The majority thus concluded that his right to counsel was to be 
analyzed with respect to the second trial, i.e., that the interac-
tion with Captain Carter, even though occurring after the first 
trial ended, constituted a pretrial confrontation in relation to 
the second trial, precisely within the scope of Massiah. 1I11 Be-
cause the right to counsel had clearly attached, the time frame 
of the confession was constitutionally irrelevant.1I6 
The majority attributed its decision to "the need to pre-
serve the protections of the sixth amendment in any trial in 
which conviction might result."117 As authority for that proposi-
tion, the majority relied on those cases which emphasize the ac-
cused's right to a fair trial and preparation of a meaningful de-
fense.1I8 The majority cited the holding of United States v. 
Wade that "in addition to counsel's presence at trial, the ac-
take place. 
[d. at 793. The dissent agreed with the majority's conclusion. [d. at 798. 
52. [d. at 79~. 
53. See supra note 51. The district court's reasoning that Cahill's confession was in 
fact "deliberately elicited" may have been influential in the State of California's conces-
sion at oral argument before the Ninth Circuit that the "deliberately elicited" element of 
Massiah had been met. 501 F. Supp. at 1224. 
54. 678 F.2d at 793. 
55. [d. Massiah had, prior to Cahi", been applied only to pretrial events. See supra 
note 26. 
56. [d. at 795. The majority pointed out that the state had cited no authority for the 
proposition that "conduct constitutionally impermissible prior to a first trial is somehow 
rendered constitutionally permissible when it occurs prior to a retrial." [d. 
57. [d. at 793. 
58. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1978); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
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cused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the 
State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in 
court or not, where counsel's absence might derogate from the 
accused's right to a fair trial."1i9 The remaining question there-
fore was whether the petitioner's rights had been substantially 
prejudiced in the particular confrontation, i.e., the "critical 
stage" test.60 
The majority decided that the Cahill-Carter conversation 
did constitute a "critical stage" of the proceeding because the 
facts in Cahill were directly comparable to those in Massiah. 
United States u. Ash, relied on by the dissent, was deemed inap-
plicable to the facts in Cahill.61 Ash held that a post-indictment 
photographic display for purposes of identification was not a 
"critical stage" because the role of the attorney was not "trial-
like" in terms of the sixth amendment.62 The Cahill court found 
Ash distinguishable, reasoning that an interview between the 
sheriff and the accused did involve the requisite sixth .amend-
ment functional role of an attorney; as in Massiah, an attorney 
could have advised the petitioner that a confession at that time 
could have adverse consequences.6S 
The majority next addressed the government's argument 
that petitioner's right to counsel had been cut off by his original 
conviction and sentencing, and was not resurrected until ar-
raignment for his retrial. 64 The panel found no sound basis for 
the mechanical view that there were in effect two separate prose-
cutions. Creating a "temporal hiatus"61i in the right to counsel 
was unjustified. To support its position, the majority analogized 
59. 678 F.2d at 794, quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 266-67 (emphasis in Cahill). 
60. 678 F.2d at 794. 
61. Id. 
62. 413 U.S. 300, 312. 
63. 678 F.2d at 794. The majority alluded specifically to a passage in Ash in which 
the Supreme Court stated: "Counsel could have advised his client on the benefits of the 
Fifth Amendment and could have sheltered him from the overreaching of the prosecu-
tion." 678 F.2d at 794, quoting Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312. The "counseling function" of the 
attorney, recognized as a doctrinal underpinning of Massiah, was relied on by the dis-
trict court in holding that the petitioner was protected by the sixth amendment. 501 F. 
Supp. 1219, 1223. 
64. 678 F.2d at 794. The majority pointed out that in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 
461-63 (1981), the Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that fifth amendment 
rights cease at the time of conviction. 678 F.2d at 794 n.3. 
65. 678 F.2d at 795. 
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to principles of double jeopardy, under which a retrial is "viewed 
as a continuation of the original proceeding."BB Because peti-
tioner's conviction was not yet final, as the admission of his con-
fession at the second trial demonstrated, and. because he had 
been indicted and continued to be in custody, he was still pro-
tected by the sixth amendment. B7 
Finally, the majority pointed to the inherent danger of a 
contrary holding: the danger of overreaching by the govern-
ment.BS The majority recognized that "if the right to the assis-
tance of counsel evaporates upon conviction or sentencing, po-
lice behavior of this sort would make it pointless to pursue an 
appeal, a major objective of which is 'a second trial uncontami-
nated by constitutional or other reversible error.' "B8 Because the 
petitioner's situation "show[ed] the very need for counsel that 
Massiah seeks to protect,"70 the majority affirmed the decision 
granting the writ of habeas corpus.'l1 
The Dissent 
The dissent framed the issue as whether Massiah should be 
extended beyond its origins of pretrial confrontations to con-
frontations occurring after trial.71 Only when pretrial confronta-
tions had been trial-like, "presenting the same dangers that gave 
birth initially to the right itself," had the Supreme Court found 
a "critical stage" in the proceedings, requiring that a defendant 
have a right to counsel's presence." The dissent argued that 
66. Id. See Note, Constitutional Law-United States v. DiFrancesco: "Continuing 
Jeopardy"-An Old Concept Gains New Life, 60 N.C.L. RBv. 425 (1982). 
67. 678 F.2d at 795. 
68. Id. The majority found that one of the principal aims of the sixth amendment is 
to protect the accused from the overreaching of the government. There were dangers in 
allowing a police department to adopt practices similar to those used in this particular 
case. The practice could "greatly prejudice a defendant who could otherwise gain an 
acquittal upon retrial, [and] confessions extracted immediately upon conviction would 
effectively obviate the necessity for retrials should defendants succeed in obtaining re-
versals of their initial convictions." Id. at 794 n.2. 
69. Id. at 795, quoting Cahill v. Rushen, 501 F. Supp. 1219, 1223. 
70. 678 F.2d at 795, quoting Cahill v. Rushen, 501 F. Supp. at 1230. 
71. 678 F.2d at 796. The court also dispensed with two collateral iBBues: (1) the de-
fendant had not waived his sixth amendment rights because the State of California had 
not proved a knowing and intentional relinquishment or abandonment; and, (2) the ad-
miBBion of the confession at the retrial was in fact prejudicial. Id. at 795. 
72. Id. at 799. 
73. Id. at BOO, quoting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 311. 
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once the trial ends and appellate stages begin, the role of coun-
sel changes. Protecting the trial rights of the defendant, the cen-
tral purpose of the sixth amendment, is no longer necessary. 
Similarly, after a trial, the presence of an attorney is no longer 
necessary to ensure its fairness. A post-trial confrontation thus 
does not constitute a "critical stage" in the proceedings, auto-
matically invoking the right to counsel. 74 
The dissent's conclusion that Massiah was inapplicable was 
based largely on the "significant differences between the trial 
and appellate stages of a criminal proceeding."7~ The appellate 
role of an attorney does not affect the integrity of the trial it-
self.76 Introducing evidence and protecting the defendant from 
the overreaching of the government, historically trial functions, 
are not part of counsel's functional role on appeaL" The "prose-
cution" of a case on appeal is based on a documentary record, 
and the function of an attorney is that of a "sword to upset the 
prior determination of guilt."78 The dissent further noted that 
although there are concerns that after trial, counsel acts as a 
buffer between the government and the legally untutored defen-
dant, arguably implicating the same dangers that the trial itself 
74. 678 F.2d at 800-01. 
75. [d . . at 801, quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (per curiam). 
76. 678 F.2d at 801. Although the dissent found that the district court judge had 
discounted the significance of the functional distinction between the role of trial and 
appellate counsel, the lower court judge had aptly noted the distinctions involved: 
Massiah seeks to protect the right of a defendant. to the ad-
vice of counsel as it relates to the gathering and introduction 
of evidence at trial. Once judgment and sentence have been 
imposed, the function of the attorney changes even if a contin-
uing legal relationship between the defendant and his attorney 
exists. This function includes marshalling an adequate record 
on appeal and arguing the prejudicial effect of alleged errors 
at the first trial. Permitting law enforcement to gather infor-
mation from the defendant would not interfere with this rela-
tionship and thus Massiah should not apply. 
Cahill v. Rushen, 501 F. Supp. 1219, 1223 (emphasis in original). In discounting its sig-
nificance, the district court judge stated: "Since the argument originated with me I found 
it initially persuasive; now, however, I do not believe it correct." [d. He justified his 
position largely on the arguments set forth by the majority in Cahill. 
77. 678 F.2d at 801-02. 
78. [d. at 802, quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 611. The dissent was influenced 
by the proposition from Ross that "The defendant needs an attorney on appeal not as a 
shield to protect him against being 'haled into court' by the State and stripped of his 
presumption of innocence, but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of 
guilt. This difference is significant .... " [d. at 610-11. 
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may present, the subsidiary Massiah rights are not necessarily 
included.'79 The shield of Massiah, assuring the defendant the 
presence of counsel during government attempts to deliberately 
elicit incriminating statements, is not guaranteed with the sword 
of appellate counsel. The dissent therefore would have held that 
the right to counsel, specifically that protection afforded a crimi-
nal defendant by the Massiah doctrine, ends at least when sen-
tence is imposed.80 Since the trial had ended, there could be no 
confrontations between the state and the defendant constituting 
a "critical stage" of the prosecution essential to the fairness of 
the trial. 81 
The dissent was both unpersuaded by the majority's reason-
ing and critical of its inability to phrase the issue presented.82 
The dissent viewed the majority's application of Massiah as ex-
panding the sixth amendment "past its historical and conceptual 
anchors, extending the right to counsel into an area unrelated to 
the concerns that prompted the initial enactment of this funda-
mental safeguard."8s On its face the sixth amendment applies 
only to trials; there existed no authority for the majority's "ex-
tension" of the rule to post-trial events.84 Considering Cahill's 
confession to be pre-second trial, as the majority had concluded, 
was a "fundamentally flawed" approach, the dissent argued, be-
cause it avoids the issue of the fairness of the first trial, the 
"gravamen of the sixth amendment."81! Further, the majority's 
scant analytical focus on the "critical stage" doctrine relied on a 
79. 678 F.2d at 802, citing United State8 v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973). "The 
Court . . . has expanded the constitutional right to counsel only when new contexts ap-
pear presenting the same dangers that gave birth initially to the right itself." [d. at 316. 
80. 678 F.2d at 802. 
81. [d. 
82. [d. at 798. The dissent pointed out that the majority first determined that Ca-
hill's confession was to be analyzed as pre-second trial but then stated the iBBue was 
whether the interview proved to be a "critical stage" of the aggregate proceedings, ana-
lyzing the second trial as a continuation of the first trial. "This inability to phrase the 
iBBue presented in any consistent manner simply illustrates the strained and groping 
analysis the majority applies in an attempt to fit Massiah to the facts of this case." [d. at 
798-99. 
83. [d. at 804. "It is unmistakable that when a court applies a pretrial rule to a post-
trial case, it is 'extending' the rule. And when the extension occurs, as it does here, with-
out anything more than naked statements unsupported by rational analysis, one wonders 
whether this extension can be considered anything less than result-oriented decision-
making." [d. at 805. 
84. See supra note 83. 
85. 678 F.2d at 804-05. 
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single clause from the Ash opinion, ignoring the import of Ash 
as requiring an historical analysis, especially for such a broad 
"extension. "S6 
The dissent argued that the petitioner's post-trial confron-
tation could have been adequately protected by the fifth amend-
ment and the concomitant procedural safeguards of Miranda.87 
By their very nature, the rights guaranteed by Miranda could 
not have ended while the petitioner remained in "custody."sS 
Because the most his lawyer could have done would have been 
to advise the petitioner not to speak, the Miranda right to re-
main silent, derived from the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, would have been the more appropriate analytical focus.8a 
The dissent did not condone the actions of the police in Cahill, 
but reasoned that the majority's application of constitutional 
protections through the sixth rather than the fifth amendment 
was not dictated by "reason, consistency, or prudence."ao 
D. CRITIQUE 
Neither the majority nor the dissent had direct authority 
86. [d. at 801-02. The dissent stated: 
[d. at 805. 
The majority, to my dismay, isolates one clause from the Ash 
opinion and completely ignores the central import of the 
Court's painstaking analysis. While Mossiah, a pretrial case, 
may well fit within the historical evolution outlined in Ash, 
the instant post-trial case clearly does not. The historical fo-
cus in Ash, concerned primarily with whether the attorney's 
role is essentially the same as his function at trial, supports 
only reversal here. 
87. [d. at 796. 
88. [d. at 802-03. 
89. [d. The dissent 888erted that since Mossiah is unrelated to the concept of com-
pulsion, the touchstone concern of the fifth amendment, and because there was no indi-
cation of coercion or prosecutorial misconduct (the confession resulting instead from an 
"intense sense of curiosity" on the part of Captain Carter), Mossiah was inapplicable. 
What was at stake in Cahill was "a defendant's interest in a trial free from his own 
inculpatory statements absent a knowing and voluntary waiver of his privilege against 
self-incrimination," the realm of the fifth amendment. [d. at 803. 
The dis8ent further argued that there was no realistic need for the police to act 
"unconstitutionally" at least until a notice of appeal was filed. Before this time a retrial 
was almost an impossibility and the purposes of the sixth amendment protections 
against prosecutorial conduct and improperly gained evidence would not be furthered by 
imposing the Mossiah protections between the time of sentencing and the initiation of 
an appeal. [d. at 802. 
90. [d. at 806. 
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for their ultimate conclusions,9! and the results are due to differ-
ing interpretations of what the underlying policies of the sixth 
amendment right to counsel should be. The majority's broad 
perspective is a more sound interpretation of the doctrinal un-
derpinning of the sixth amendment, though its opinion is over-
simplified and vaguely reasoned. The dissent's view, while well 
reasoned, is overly narrow, especially in light of recent Supreme 
Court cases broadly construing the right to counsel. 
The significance of the timing of the petitioner's confession 
was the major issue in Cahill. The traditional focus of analysis 
in sixth amendment cases is on the "trial",92 and the conflicting 
conclusions reached in Cahill reflect different operational view-
points as to the application of the Massiah doctrine. The major-
ity focused on the nature of the confrontation and its effect on 
any subsequent "trial", while the dissent viewed the Massiah 
protections as applying only to stages leading up to and through 
the "trial".93 
The interview between Captain Carter and the petitioner 
clearly constituted a "trial-like confrontation" in its most literal 
adversarial sense. The direct character of the confrontation led 
to the majority's rather abrupt conclusion that the interview was 
a "critical stage."9. Because the first trial had ended, the real 
danger to the petitioner was in terms of a possible second trial. 
The majority therefore analyzed the post-conviction interview as 
a pretrial confrontation, believing the touchstone of the Massiah 
. doctrine to be the admission of illegally obtained evidence in 
91. Both the majority and the dissent declared that the other had no authority for 
the conclusions reached. [d. at 795, 802. Each side relied on predominantly the same 
cases, but interpreted them differently. 
92. See supra text accompanying notes 16-22. 
93. The district court in Cahill also discussed the practical definition of "trial" 
counsel, stating that the notion that the function of "trial" counsel ended with convic-
tion and sentencing was too narrow a view: "[TJhe trial attorney has an affirmative duty 
to protect his client's right to appeal by filing a notice of appeal, or by telling his client 
how the client can proceed on his own behalf." Cahill v. Rushen, 501 F. Supp. at 1222, 
quoting Gairson v. Cupp, 415 F.2d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1969). The district court then 
stated that since the "trial" duties of the I\ttorney do not end upon sentencing but con· 
tinue until a notice of appeal was filed, petitioner was protected by the sixth amendment 
until the filing of a notice of appeal. 501 F. Supp. at 1222-23. The Ninth Circuit dissent 
maintained that the so-called trial·duty of filing notice of appeal simply constituted an 
appellate function of an attorney. 678 F.2d at 803-04. 
94. 678 F.2d at 794. 
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any subsequent trial where conviction might result. Thus the 
timing of the confession was deemed "constitutionally irrele-
vant" because of the majority's focus on the nature of the con-
frontation and the danger to the defendant. 
While the majority's logic is attractive, it is not wholly con-
sistent. After determining that the confession was to be consid-
ered pre-second trial, the majority found there was no sound ba-
sis for the view that there were two "prosecutions" in Cahill, 
relying on double jeopardy principles which view the second trial 
as a continuation of the original proceeding. ell The majority thus 
placed itself in the position of treating the interview with Cap-
tain Carter as pre-second trial, separate from the first trial, and 
then to the contrary, as part of a continuous process. Although 
there may be an explanation for this inconsistency,e8 because it 
was confronting the sixth amendment implications of a post-
trial confession for the first time, the majority should have more 
clearly set forth the reasons for its conclusion. 
The dissent's inquiry focused on the literal meaning of 
"trial" rather than on "trial-like confrontation." Because the in-
terview took place after the petitioner's first trial, it was not a 
"critical stage" of the proceedings because of the distinctive 
roles of trial and appellate counsel. Thus, the timing, not the 
nature, of the confrontation was of primary concern for the pur-
poses of the sixth amendment analysis, at least until the peti-
tioner was arraigned for his second trial. 
The problem with the dissent's conclusion is that it adopts 
too rigid and literal a reading of the sixth amendment. The dis-
sent reasonably argued that the "critical stage" test was affected 
95. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67. 
96. The explanation may be that there are both separate and continuous elements 
to the sixth amendment right to counsel, especially when applied to a post-conviction 
and sentencing context. For instance, both the dissent and the majority agreed that the 
petitioner's right to counsel had attached, and neither argued that it had detached in 
any way (though the diBBent argued that the right had significantly changed). Thus, it 
was a continuous process. Further, the petitioner was retried on the same outstanding 
indictment, continued over after the reversal of his first conviction. In terms of a sepa-
rate element, the majority rightfully pointed out that the danger to the petitioner was in 
the second trial. His confeBBion could not affect his first conviction and thus they were 
quite separate processes. The majority, however, never explained its reasoning for using 
the two opposing analyses. See also supra note 93 for the district court's reasoning as to 
how the first trial continues after sentencing. 
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by the differing roles of trial and appellate counsel, considering 
the sixth amendment's focus on the "trial". However, the dissent 
pointed out that after trial, there are legitimate concerns that 
counsel act as a buffer between the government and the legally 
untutored defendant which arguably implicates the sixth 
amendment function of neutralizing the dangers of the trial it-
self. Even if such concerns were implicated, the dissent main-
tained, only the sword of appellate counsel was thereby guaran-
teed and not the shield of Massiah.97 The weakness of this 
argument is that there is no authority for the conclusion that 
the Massiah protections were not invoked by the post-trial dan-
gers. The cases dealing wit~ the appellate role of counsel are 
concerned with the actual ability to retain a lawyer or to have 
one provided,88 in effect giving the defendant a sword, and not 
with confrontations between the government and the accused. 
Until Cahill, the issue had never been presented as to whether 
the shield of Massiah accompanied the sword of appellate coun-
sel. The majority took a broader view of the sixth amendment 
by realizing the importance of the "assistance of counsel" in sit-
uations of governmental confrontation, and by holding that peti-
tioner was in this case protected. 
The majority and dissent also differed in their interpreta-
tions of United States v. Ash." The majority found Ash sup-
portive of its decision because Ash focused on the functional role 
of the attorney, and the attorney in Cahill as in Massiah could 
have advised the defendant of his constitutional rights. loo The 
dissent argued that Ash stands for an historical focus as to 
whether the attorney's role is the same as his function at 
"trial''' 101 supporting the distinction between trial and appellate 
functions. While Ash did examine the historical evolution of the 
sixth amendment right to counsel, it did not draw a distinction 
between the appellate and trial functions of an attorney. Rather, 
Ash stands for the proposition that the nature of the confronta-
tion between the government and the accused must be analyzed 
97. See supra text accompanying notes 75-81. 
98. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (per curiam); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 355 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). See also Gairson v. Cupp, 
supra note 93. 
99. 413 U.S. 300 (1973). 
100. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64. 
101. See supra note 82. 
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to determine whether a "trial-like" situation is involved. One of 
the implicit questions is therefore whether the assistance of an 
attorney is needed to counsel, advise, or shelter the accused. l02 
In Cahill the petitioner needed that assistance in order to over-
come his misconceptions regarding the effect of his confession,103 
and therefore the majority 'correctly interpreted Ash as support-
ing its position. 
The dissent conceded the impropriety of the confrontation 
between Captain Carter and the petitioner, but maintained that 
Miranda and the fifth amendment should have been applied 
rather than Massiah and the sixth amendment. This argument 
overlooks the sixth amendment's focus on the assistance of an 
attorney to counsel and advise the criminal defendant. An attor-
ney could have advised the petitioner not to incriminate himself. 
While the interaction between Captain Carter and the petitioner 
may have constituted "custodial interrogation" in terms of Mi-
randa, it does not follow that the sixth amendment was there-
fore inapplicable.lo• The Supreme Court has expressed a prefer-
ence for the sixth amendment protections, lOG and the Ninth 
Circuit in Cahill recognized this trend by attempting to define 
the policy boundaries of this important constitutional 
protection. 
E. SIGNIFICANCE 
The Cahill majority unexplainedly emphasized the narrow-
ness of its holding. loe While Cahill presented a peculiar fact situ-
ation and may be narrow in that regard, interpreting the Mas-
siah doctrine to apply to "any subsequent trial for which 
defendant is then under indictment"107 cannot be considered a 
narrow holding. The potential effect of the decision is that a 
criminal defendant is protected by the shield of the sixth 
102. 413 U.S. 300, 312. 
103. The majority pointed out that the "sixth amendment requires that counsel 'be 
provided to prevent the defendant himself from falling into traps'," 678 F.2d at 794, 
quoting United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 899-90 (2d Cir. 1969). The dissent con-
ceded that while the majority was rightfully concerned about the petitioner falling into a 
trap, it had no authority to apply Massiah pursuant to Ash. Id. at 805. 
104. See supra note 63. 
105. See generally Interrogation, supra note 12; Massiah Revitalized, supra note 
39. 
106. 678 F.2d at 795. 
107. Id. 
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amendment until the appellate process has ended, or where a 
retrial becomes an impossibility. Although attempts to elicit in-
criminating statements within that period may be rare, a rever-
sal of a first conviction is not a rare occurrence, and for that 
reason, the decision has a potentially broad impact. A conse-
quence of Cahill may be to impose restrictions on post-trial gov-
ernmental behavior so as to prevent overreaching or attempts to 
elicit incriminating evidence.108 Once the right to counsel at-
taches, it now protects the defendant through the criminal pro-
cess to the point where an adversarial relationship with the gov-
ernment no longer exists. Such a broad proposition is by no 
means "narrow." 
The majority held that the defendant must be at least "af-
forded an opportunity to consult with counsel" or deliberately 
elicited incriminating statements would be excluded at a subse-
quent tria1.109 The majority however, neglected to define what is 
meant by "an opportunity to consult," and what is needed to 
satisfy that standard. Historically, decisions interpreting Mas-
siah have been based on the presence or absence of counsel 
rather than on any opportunity to consult. The absence of coun-
sel is the dispositive element of the Massiah doctrine. In its pol-
icy oriented interpretation of the sixth amendment, the majority 
seems to have created a diminished right to counsel. If the peti-
tioner had been told that he could call his attorney, would that 
have been a sufficient "opportunity to consult" under the court's 
definition? The majority created significant problems by stray-
ing from the traditional Massiah analysis.110 By so doing, it may 
108. Both the majority and the di88ent addre88ed the dangers which could arise if 
the sixth amendment were not to apply to post-trial confrontations. The majority feared 
that if the convicted defendant were unprotected the government would attempt to elicit 
incriminating evidence 80 as to insure the futility of a retrial. See supra note 68. The 
dissent argued that there was no realistic need to act "unconstitutionally" after a convic-
tion until a second trial at least became a p088ibility, i.e., until a notice of appeal was 
filed. See supra note 89. 
109. 678 F.2d at 795 (emphasis added). The majority had previously noted that if 
the petitioner had been allowed a brief consultation with his attorney, it would have 
corrected his uninformed notion that a confession at that time could have no adverse 
consequences. [d. at 794. 
110. The district court in Cahill had been much more definitive. It held that up 
until the filing of a notice of appeal, the defendant has a "right to the advice and counsel 
of an attorney regarding any statements he makes to law enforcement or its agents," and 
if such statements were elicited "in the absence of counsel and without a waiver of coun-
sel's presence," they must be excluded. 501 F. Supp. at 1224. By Btraying from the tradi-
tional Massiah analysiB, the majority undercut its holding that the confrontation in Ca-
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have undercut its own newly-interpreted application of Massiah. 
Perhaps that is what the majority meant in terming its decision 
"narrow." It now remains for future courts to either interpret 
the Cahill decision or restate the sixth amendment protections 
which continue after a defendant's conviction and sentencing. At 
a minimum however, Cahill does signal the Ninth Circuit's rec-
ognition of Massiah's emphasis on the advisory function of the 
attorney in the criminal context. 
Robert F. Waggener* 
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW & 
PROCEDURE 
A. DETENTION OF INANIMATE OBJECTS TO BE JUDGED UNDER REA-
SONABLE SUSPICION TEST 
In United States v. Martell,l the Ninth Circuit held that no 
fourth amendment right was invaded where suitcases were de-
tained for twenty minutes upon a well-founded suspicion that 
they contained narcotics.li 
A DEA agent in San Diego received a tip that the defen-
dants were to fly from Anchorage to San Diego.3 The San Diego 
airport was placed under surveillance. One defendant arrived 
that night with two suitcases and checked into a nearby hotel; 
the second arrived the next morning, checking into the same ho-
tel. Later that morning, both returned to the San Diego Airport 
and purchased tickets back to Anchorage. The defendants were 
detained by DEA agents as they approached the boarding area. 
Twenty minutes later the suspects and their luggage were taken 
hill could be regarded as pre-second trial, suitable for traditional sixth amendment 
analysis. Clearly the fact that the confession was post-trial was important to the court, 
contrliry to its assertion. 
• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law 
1. 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Curtis, D.J.; sitting by designation; the other 
panel members were Farris, J. and Nelson, J., dissenting) (as amended, Nov. 6, 1981). 
2. Id. at 1363. But see United States v. Belcher, 685 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1982), where 
the Ninth Circuit appeared to limit Martell by holding the Martell reasonable suspicion 
standard inapplicable where an individual's luggage is not left unattended. Id. at 290. 
3. 654 F.2d at 1357. This information, although given in good faith, was erroneous. 
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to the police office where the luggage was sniffed by a narcotics 
detector dog. The dog gave a positive alert for narcotics in the 
suitcases. The alert provided probable cause for obtaining a 
search warrant. Mter procuring the warrant, the suitcases were 
searched and a large quantity of cocaine was discovered inside. 
Based upon this evidence, defendants were convicted of conspir-
acy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute.· The defendants' primary con-
tention was that their twenty minute detention by DEA agents 
constituted an illegal seizure unsupported by probable cause. II 
The court began its analysis by asserting that there existed 
a "conceptual difference" between the detention of the suspects 
and the detention of their suitcases.e The panel first concluded 
that the detention of the defendants was justified as the agents 
had a well-founded suspicion that the suspects were engaged in 
drug trafficking.' The court then distinguished the seizure of the 
suspects from the detention of their luggage: "Terry and Duna-
way and their progeny relate to detention of persons and not 
inanimate objects ... [the] seizure of which constitute a sub-
stantially less serious intrusion upon the rights of the 
individual. "8 
Making this distinction, the court then focused upon what it 
termed the "real issue": "whether the government agents can 
detain the appellants' suitcases without probable cause, but 
upon a well founded suspicion, for twenty minutes without run-
ning afoul of the fourth amendment."" 
Relying upon the Supreme Court decision in United States 
v. Van Leeuwen,lO where first-class mail was detained for more 
than a day, the court concluded that the detention of the suit-
cases was reasonable.ll The court stated that Van Leeuwen 
sanctions the detention of inanimate objects without probable 
cause where there is reasonable suspicion that they are involved 
4. Defendants were convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(I), 846 (1976). 
5. 654 F.2d at 1358. 
6.ld. 
7. Id. at 1358-59. 
8. rd. at 1359. 
9. rd. at 1358. 
10. 397 U.S. 249 (1970). 
11. 654 F.2d at 1361. 
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in criminal activity.12 Further, the court noted that it knew of no 
cases which placed a time limit on the detention of inanimate 
objects, and, in any event, the detention in this case was well 
within the time allowed in Van Leeuwen.13 
The court pointed out that the fourth amendment applies 
only to unreasonable searches and seizures and that there are 
many instances where warrantless searches without probable 
cause have been held to be reasonable.14 The panel noted that 
these decisions are "bottomed upon the concept that in the light 
of all the circumstances the searches are not unreasonable by 
constitutional standards."11i The court interpreted this to mean 
that warrantless intrusions on less than probable cause are rea-
sonable as long as the officer has an "articulable basis" for sus-
pecting criminal activity. IS The court found that at the time the 
bags were seized such a basis existed.1'1 
Judge Nelson, dissenting, disagreed with the majority's ap-
proach of separating the issue of the seizure of the luggage from 
the issue of the seizure of the suspects. The dissent first noted 
that the seizure of the luggage was clearly ancillary to the un-
lawful arrest and therefore should not have been subjected to a 
separate analysis.18 The cases upon which the majority relied did 
12. [d. at 1359-60. In Van Leeuwen, two 12-pound packages of coins, suspected by 
government agents of being part of an illegal coin importation system, sent by first class 
mail, were stopped and delayed for more than a day while an investigation was con-
ducted. 397 U.S. at 249-50. 
13. 654 F.2d at 1360. 
14. [d. at 1360. As examples, the court pointed to border searches, administrative 
searches and regulatory searches. [d. at 1360-61. 
15. [d. at 1361. 
16. [d. at 1361 n.3. 
17. [d. at 1361. The court then held that even assuming the arrest was unlawful, it 
did not taint the search and seizure of the suitcases since such evidence is evaluated by 
whether it was obtained before or after the detention becomes lawful. [d. at 1362. The 
court noted that this concept has been recognized in the Ninth Circuit as well as in other 
circuits. See United States v. Viegas, 639 F.2d 42 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 
(1981) (luggage seized simultaneously with detention of suspects; motion to suppress 
contraband found therein was denied); United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 
1980) (luggage seized prior to unlawful arrest was upheld as reasonable); United States v. 
Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1979) (court admitted statements made in the early 
stages of an arrest before its illegality occurred); United States v. Mayes, 524 F.2d 803 
(9th Cir. 1975) (contraband seized as a result of evidence gathered during a legal border 
search was not tainted by later illegal detention). 
18. 654 F.2d at 1370. 
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not support separating the analysis.19 In addition, the seizures of 
the defendants and their suitcases were part of a single, unified 
police action.IIO The dissent disapproved of what it termed "the 
judicial technique of winnowing a fortuitous 'lawful' facet out of 
an otherwise unlawful incident. "11 
The dissent also challenged the majority's analysis of the 
seizure of the luggage. First, the majority abandoned the pre-
mise that searches and seizures executed without a warrant are 
presumed to be unreasonable, and articulated no exception to 
the warrant requirement applicable to this case.22 Further, the 
dissent contended that Van Leeuwen applies only to the nature 
and extent of fourth amendment rights in mail and that a 
broader application misconstrued the Supreme Court's holding 
in that case. The Court in Van Leeuwen gave no indication that 
its ruling extended beyond the application to mail.23 Further, 
the Court did not conclude that the mail had been "seized" 
since mail is necessarily voluntarily placed in the government's 
possession. Under the majority's interpretation of Van Leeuwen, 
an object could lawfully be held for nearly a day without proba-
ble cause. "Such a result cannot seriously be argued, which only 
illustrates how limited the applicability of Van Leeuwen must 
truly be."S. 
Finally, the dissent contended that the court's holding that 
warrantless seizures of objects are to be examined in terms of 
reasonableness under the circumstances is "impossible to square 
with the repeated statements by the Supreme Court on the sub-
ject of the warrant requirement."1II In addition, the cases relied 
on by the majority did not actually support the "reasonableness 
in light of all the circumstances rationale. "18 Border searches, 
19. Id. at 1369. The majority relied on United States v. Chamberlin, 664 F.2d 1262 
(9th Cir. 1980) and United States v. Mayes, 524 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1975) for support of 
the separation of the arrest from the seizure of luggage. However, in Chamberlin, state-
ments made during a Terry stop were not suppressed when that stop later became an 
unlawful arrest. In Mayes, defendant made statements while initially detained which led 
to discovery of marijuana which provided probable cause for his arrest. 
20. 654 F.2d at 1370. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 1364-66. 
23. Id. at 1367. 
24. Id. at 1368. 
25. Id. at 1364. 
26. Id. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 621 (1977) (border search excep-
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regulatory searches and administrative searches are relatively 
unique circumstances which are exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement.1I7 The dissent warned that courts "cannot ignore the 
doctrinal framework of decided fourth amendment law in search 
of a particular result. "28 
B. NEW TRIAL ORDERS NOT ,ApPEALABLE BY THE GOVERNMENT 
BEFORE RETRIAL 
In United States v. Dior,29 the Ninth Circuit held that new 
trial orders in criminal cases are not appealable before retrial 
either under 28 U.S.C. section 129180 or under section 3731 of 
the Criminal Appeals Act.81 The court found that jurisdiction 
was lacking under section 1291 because new trial orders resolve 
tion is a long-standing, historically recognized exception to the fourth amendment's war-
rant requirement); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (exception to search 
warrant requirement for closely regulated industries subject to close inspection and su-
pervision); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (home visit required for AFDC eligibil-
ity not a search). 
27. 654 F.2d at 1365. 
28. [d. at 1363. 
29. 671 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were 
Poole, J. and Karlton, D.J., sitting by designation) (rehearing denied, June I, 1982). 
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides: "The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals of all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ... except where 
a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." 
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1982) provides: 
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a 
court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a dis-
trict court dismissing an indictment or information as to any 
one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the 
double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution pro-
hibits further prosecution. 
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of ap-
peals from a decision or order of a district court's suppressing 
or excluding evidence or requiring the return of seized prop-
erty in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant 
has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on 
an indictment or information, if the United States Attorney 
certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for 
purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof 
of a fact material in the proceeding. 
The appeal in all such cases shall be taken within thirty 
days after the decision, judgment or order has been rendered 
and shall be diligently prosecuted. 
Pending the prosecution and determination of the appeal 
in the foregoing instances, the defendant shall be released in 
accordance with chapter 207 of this title. 
The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed 
to effectuate its purposes. 
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no questions of guilt or innocence, nor do they determine a sen-
tence.82 However, the government argued that the legislative his-
tory of section 3731 and the Supreme Court decision of United 
States v. Wilson88 authorized government appeals from new trial 
orders in criminal prosecutions.84 In denying the government's 
contention, the court first pointed out that even though section 
3731 should be construed liberally, it was not intended to abol-
ish the final judgment rule of section 1291 for criminal appeals 
prosecuted by the government. Thus while section 3731 may 
have authorized such appeals, it did not enlarge the court of ap-
peal's power to accept an appeal under section 1291.811 The juris-
dictional requirements of both section 3731 and section 1291 
must be met before the court can recognize the government's 
right to appeal. 86 
The government also argued that since section 3731, as 
amended in 1970, permits the government to appeal from sup-
pression orders even though they are not final judgments, this 
exception should be extended to include orders granting new tri-
als. The court noted that Congress' purpose for allowing imme-
diate appeals of suppression orders stems from the high number 
of inconsistent rulings at the trial level in the area of search and 
seizure law.8? No such concerns would be addressed by allowing 
immediate appeals of new trial orders. In addition, the limited 
circumstances under which the government may appeal a sup-
pression order88 demonstrate Congress' intent to minimize ap-
pellate interference in the trial process.89 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit suggested a number of policy rea-
32. 671 F.2d at 354. The government did not argue that an order granting a new 
trial falls within the "collateral order" exception established by Cohen v. Beneficial In-
dustrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 671 F.2d at 354 n.6. 
33. 420 U.S. 332 (1975). In Wilson, the Court stated that by amending section 3731, 
"Congress intended to remove all statutory barriers to Government appeals and to allow 
appeals whenever the Constitution would permit." Id. at 337. 
34. 671 F.2d at 355. 
35.Id. 
36. Id. See United States v. Hetrick, 644 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1981) (review of sentenc-
ing order final decision, under section 1291 and authorized under section 3731). 
37. 671 F.2d at 356. 
38. To appeal a suppression order, the United States Attorney must certify that the 
appeal is not taken for purp08es of delay and that the evidence is substantial proof of a 
fact material to the proceedings. Id. See supra note 31. 
39. 671 F.2d at 356. 
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sons that strongly support the non-appealability of new trial or-
ders prior to retrial. First, there is a firm congressional policy 
against piecemeal appeals, and while this policy is important in 
civil cases, it has even more force in criminal cases where delay 
might seriously disrupt the functioning of the criminal justice 
system.40 Delays in criminal cases are particularly critical since 
the defendant's guilt or innocence has not yet been determined. 
Second, piecemeal review is inefficient since the appeal of new 
trial orders may be unnecessary after retrial. The court also ex-
pressed concern that appellate intervention prior· to retrial will 
interfere with the effective operation of the district courts by 
undermining the district court's autonomy, its unique expertise 
in determining important legal and factual issues, and its ability 
to correct its own mistakes.41 
While it is well settled in civil cases that new trial orders are 
not immediately appealable, the federal courts have only re-
cently considered the issue in criminal cases. The Ninth Cir-
cuit's holding is consistent with the other circuits that have de-
cided this question.42 Given Congress' strong policy against 
allowing interlocutory appeals, it is doubtful that Congress, in 
amending section 3731, intended to impliedly amend section 
1291 to permit appeals from otherwise non-appealable orders. If 
Congress did in fact so intend, it is up to Congress to express its 
intent explicitly, rather than for the courts to alter their juris-
dictional powers under section 1291. 
C. DENIAL OF FULL NUMBER OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
GROUNDS FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF 
In Hines v. Enomoto,48 the Ninth Circuit held that denial of 
a defendant's right to exercise the full number of peremptory 
40.Id. 
41. Id. After denying the appealability of the order, the court declined to issue a 
writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976). 
42. See United States v. Hitchmon, 602 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1979); In re United 
States, 565 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Alberti, 568 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1977). 
In the recent case of United States v. Atwell, 681 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth 
Circuit, relying on Dior, held that the government could not appeal the granting of a 
motion to dismiss by a magistrate on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
because there had been no sentencing or determination of guilt or innocence. Id. at 594. 
43. 658 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Anderson, J.; the other panel members were 
Takasugi, D.J., sitting by designation, and Norris, J., dissenting) (rehearing en banc de-
nied, Nov. 30, 1981). 
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challenges provided by state law is grounds for federal habeas 
corpus relief. 
Petitioner was convicted of murder in a California state 
court. California law grants to defendants facing a possible sen-
tence of death or life imprisonment twenty-six peremptory chal-
lenges." After exercising his twelfth challenge, the court clerk 
erroneously informed petitioner's counsel that he had only one 
remaining challenge. A thirteenth challenge was exercised and 
thereafter petitioner's counsel made no objection to the denial of 
his client's full allotment of challenges.411 Petitioner was there-
fore barred from litigating the issue on appeal by California's 
contemporaneous objection rule.48 
The Ninth Circuit panel conceded that the constitution 
does not expressly guarantee the right to exercise peremptory 
challenges. However, the Supreme Court has characterized the 
peremptory challenge as "a necessary part of trial by jury."4? 
Additionally, in the Ninth Circuit, denial of the challenge consti-
tutes reversible error on direct appeal.48 The panel emphasized 
that the peremptory challenge "represents an important, per-
haps even vital safeguard of the right to an impartial trial, a 
right guaranteed by the sixth amendment, and one which lies at 
the heart of the right to due process."48 Thus, the abridgement 
of peremptory challenges is equivalent to those grounds for 
habeas corpus relief which, although not based upon a violation 
of a constitutional guarantee, are nevertheless necessary compo-
nents of a defendant's right to due process.IIO The majority then 
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1070(a) (West Supp. 1982). 
45. 658 F.2d at 671. 
46. See Jackson v. Superior Court in and for San Diego County, 10 Cal. 2d 350, 74 
P.2d 243 (1957). 
47. See Swain v. Alabama, 388 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). See also Pointer v. United 
States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894). 
48. See United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1977) (error for trial court to 
improperly refuse to dismiss two jurors for cause as the defendant was thereby forced to 
exercise two of his alloted peremptory challenges); United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 535 
(9th Cir. 1977) (error for trial court not to clearly explain the procedure for exercising 
peremptory challenges). 
49. 658 F.2d at 672. 
50. See, e.g., Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 922 
(1980). The court in Hines declined to follow the only case it had found dealing directly 
with the issue before it. See Workman v. Caldwell, 338 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 
471 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973) (limitations on the exer-
cise of peremptory challenges are a matter of state law, and therefore not grounds for 
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held that petitioner stated a claim for federal habeas corpus re-
lief "[b]ecause an outright denial of half the number of allotted 
peremptories may vitally affect the integrity of the jury selection 
process and, by implication, the fairness of the trial itself."IH 
The court remanded the case for a factual determination of 
whether under the facts of the case, the "cause" and "prejudice" 
requirement of Wainwright v. Sykes52 was satisfied. 53 
Judge Norris, dissenting, argued that however important 
the peremptory challenge is, it is not constitutionally guaran-
teed, and thus no habeas corpus relief was available. In Stilson 
v. United States,54 the Supreme Court had specifically held that 
peremptory challenges are not constitutionally secured, and 
therefore a state can limit the number of challenges it provides 
by statute. 55 In addition, it was inconceivable that petitioner's 
right to a fair trial had been violated since he had received thir-
teen peremptory challenges, the amount California provides in 
non-capital prosecutions. The majority did not contend that a 
state providing, for example, only ten peremptory challenges 
would thereby violate the constitution. Therefore, petitioner's 
right to an impartial jury was not violated in this case. 56 
Finally, the dissent contended that habeas corpus relief 
could not be justified on the ground that the state, having 
granted the right to exercise peremptory challenges, violates the 
constitution by denying that right at triaP7 In Hines, there was 
no evidence that the denial of additional peremptories was in-
tentional, and defense counsel had made no objection. Under the 
majority's approach, "the denial of any state procedural right 
which-although not constitutionally required-can be deemed 
important might be held to violate to the Due Process Clause," a 
result which "sets the stage for the wholesale constitutionaliza-
federal habeas corpus relieO. 
51. 658 F.2d at 672. 
52. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
53. For the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the "cause" prong of this standard, see 
Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1981). 
54. 250 U.S. 583 (1919). 
55. Id. at 586. The majority responded that Stilson was inapposite because in 
Hines, the state had not sought to limit the number of challenges available under state 
law. Therefore, "Stilson simply does not address the proposition we are forced to face in 
this case." 658 F.2d at 673 n.l. 
56. 658 F.2d at 679. 
57.Id. 
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tion of the myriad state rules of criminal procedure."GS The dis-
sent feared that this would likely "impair rather than strengthen 
the federal court's role in protecting the constitutional right of 
state defendants' to a fair trial."Gt 
D. THE Allen DOCTRINE IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
In two recent decisions dealing with Allen charges,SO the 
Ninth Circuit seemingly formulated inconsistent holdings. How-
ever, these decisions are reconcilable in light of the specific facts 
of each case, and the underlying philosophies of the two 
decisions. 
In United States v. Armstrong,Sl the court held that the use 
of Allen charges in the initial instructions, and later repeated in 
a supplementary instruction given as a result of a jury deadlock, 
did not violate the rule prohibiting Allen charges from being 
read twice. The court also held that it was not error to instruct 
the majority of the jurors to reexamine its position in light of 
the minority~s views without also instructing the minority to re-
examine its views in light of the majority's views. 
In his initial instructions the trial judge stated, "If, there-
fore, it looks at some point that you may have difficulty in 
reaching a unanimous verdict and if a substantially greater num-
ber of you are agreed on a verdict, the other jurors may want to 
ask themselves about the basis for their feelings when a substan-
tial number have reached a different conclusion."ss The trial 
judge also instructed the jury to "attempt to reach a verdict but, 
58.ld. 
59.ld. 
60. The Allen charge is named after the jury instructions approved by the Supreme 
Court in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). There, the Court approved of sup-
plementary instructions given when the jurors are deadlocked. Allen charges are used as 
a reminder to the individual juror to reconsider the reasonablene88 of his views, yet to 
maintain those views which are "conciously and honestly" held. As noted in United 
States v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1981), "The charge has also been called the ... 
'shotgun instruction'" as a result of the coercive force upon the individual jurors, espe-
cially those in the minority. Id. at 1265 n.l. See Marcus, The Allen Instruction in Crimi-
nal Cases: Is the Dynamite Charge About to be Permanently Defused? 43 Mo. L. REV. 
613 (1978). 
61. 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1981) (per East, D.J.; the other panel members were 
Wright, J. and Merrill, J., concurring) (rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, Oct. 16, 
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1032 (1982). 
62. 654 F.2d at 1333-34. 
66
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/10
1983] CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 229 
of course, only if each of you can do so after having made his or 
her own conscientious determination. Do not surrender an hon-
est conviction as to the weight and effect of the evidence simply 
to arrive at a verdict. "68 
After seven days of deliberations, the trial judge gave a sec-
ond set of jury instructions:" 
At the beginning of the case, I gave you in-
structions concerning your sworn duty to retlU'n a 
verdict. . . without surrendering an honest belief 
and conviction that you held, and, of course, in a 
manner consistent with the evidence [, and] to re-
turn a verdict if your could do so without surren-
dering an honest conviction. You may consult 
those instructions again.811 
Later that afternoon, the jury returned guilty verdicts on 
some counts and no verdict on other counts. 
As to the exclusion of a statement of the first set of instruc-
tions that the majority should reexamine its views in light of 
those held by the minority, the court stated that the "absence of 
such reciprocal language [did] not render the instructions imper-
missibly coercive. "66 Classifying the instructions as only a "mild 
form" of the regular Allen charges, the court pointed out that 
the instructions did not include the normal "cost analysis" usu-
ally given in a jury deadlock. They were also less coercive than 
normal Allen charges since they were given in the initial instruc-
tions, and not after the jury had reached a deadlock. Although it 
is "better practice" to include reciprocal language, excluding this 
language did not render the instructions impermissibly 
coercive.67 
In relation to the second set of instructions, the court noted 
that there is a "per se rule against repeating an Allen charge to a 
63. ld. at 1334. 
64. This was prompted by a note sent by a juror concerning her wish to be excused. 
Throughout the deliberations, the jurors repeatedly sent notes to the court. There were 
enough notes from the jury that the circuit court noted that "This was a jury of prolific 
writers. Notes flowed to the court like rainwater in the rain forests." 654 F.2d at 1331. 
65. ld. at 1334. 
66.ld. 
67.ld. 
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jury."68 However, the court found that this rule did not apply 
given the facts at hand. Classifying the second instructions as a 
'pseudo-Allen charge',69 the court pointed out that the per se 
rule only prohibits repeating an Allen charge twice after a jury 
has reached a deadlock. Here, by contrast, the mild Allen charge 
was given in the opening instructions, and the second reminder 
of the original instruction was given only after the jury had 
deadlocked. The second instruction was "no more than a re-
minder of the first, and was milder still. "70 Although again the 
court should have given the instruction only once, the second 
instruction did not constitute reversible error. 
In United States u. Mason71 the court held that a deviation 
from the normal supplementary jury instructions approved in 
Allen must be counterbalanced by an instruction to the minority 
not to surrender its conscientiously held views merely to secure 
a verdict. 
After the jury informed the judge it was "having problems" 
reaching a verdict, the trial judge, without giving notice to either 
counsel of his intent, gave the following modified Allen charge to 
the jury: "The trial has been expensive in three areas: In time, in 
effort, and in money .... "72 "There appears to be no reason to 
believe that another trial would not be costly to both sides, nor 
does it appear to be any reason to believe that the case can be 
tried again by either side better or more exhaustively that has 
been tried by you. "73 Finally, the judge read the specific instruc-
tions approved by the Supreme Court in Allen. 
The court first noted the utility of the Allen charge in gen-
eral, and the Ninth Circuit's approval of Allen charges given in 
68. [d. See United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 991 (1978) (reversible error to twice issue Allen charges in response to 
jury deadlock). 
69. 654 F.2d at 1335. 
70. [d. Judge Merrill, concurring, stated that the danger presented by the Allen 
charge exists not when they are issued before deliberations, but rather after a deadlock. 
In this context, "coercion exists . . . not in the fact that the jury was directed to con-
tinue to deliberate, but in the language used in so directing it." [d. at 1337. 
71. 658 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Kennedy, J.; the other panel members were 
Browning, J. and Hoffman, D.J., sitting by designation) (rehearing denied, Dec. 16, 
1981). 
72. [d. at 1271. 
73. [d. 
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either the initial instructions or as a supplementary charge.74 
However, the court pointed out that earlier holdings have noted 
that the Allen charge "stands at the brink of impermissible co-
ercion,"75 and "even in the most acceptable form, approaches 
the ultimate permissible limits to which a court may go. . . ."76 
Thus, when an appeal is based upon an improper Allen charge, 
the court will "give close scrutiny to the actual charge and cir-
cumstances in which it was given," and will uphold the charge 
"only if in a form not more coercive than approved in Allen v. 
United States . ... "77 Also, the court will look to other factors, 
such as deliberation time after the charges are read, difficulty of 
the case in relation to the time of deliberation, and other "evi-
dence of undue pressure on the jury."76 
Applying this standard, the court found that the trial 
judge's additional comments concerning the "injection of fiscal 
concerns into jury deliberations ... ," and the "comment that 
the Supreme Court had approved the instructions"79 resulted in 
a more coercive charge than was approved in Allen. More impor-
tantly, the trial judge made no "attempt to counterbalance his 
excesses by further instructing the minority not to abandon its 
conscientiously held views merely to secure a verdict. "SO The 
court pointed out that some excesses or additions to the supple-
mentary charge approved in Allen have been upheld as long as 
the jurors are reminded of their "obligation to follow [their] con-
scientiously held opinion. "SI Since, however, this important re-
minder was not included in the supplementary charge, and be-
cause the comments by the trial judge went beyond that 
approved in Allen, the charge given was "impermissibly 
coercive. "S2 
74. The Allen charge has been disapproved in three circuits. See United States v. 
Silvern, 484 F.2d 879, 883 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1187 
(D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 420 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
396 U.S. 837 (1969). 
75. United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 991 (1978). 
76. Sullivan v. United States, 414 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1969). 
77. 658 F.2d at 1266. 
78.Id. 
79. Id. at 1267. 
80.Id. 
81. Id. at 1268. See United States v. Beattie, 613 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980); Sullivan v. United States, 414 U.S. 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1969). 
82. 658 F.2d at 1268. 
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Although Mason and Armstrong may, at first blush, appear 
inconsistent, the two opinions are reconcilable. First, the court 
in Mason explicitly left open the possibility of Allen charges 
given in the original and in supplementary instructions without 
violation of the per se rule.8S Second, both courts weighed vari-
ous factors, explicitly and implicitly, in reaching their decisions, 
such as the total deliberation time, the practical impact of the 
charges (how long after the charges did the jury deliberate), the 
harshness of the charge (references to time and money), the ef-
fect the charges would have on the minority, and when the 
charges were given (in the initial instructions or after deadlock), 
against the strength of the statement that each individual juror 
should retain his or her own honest and conscientiously held be-
liefs. Both courts attempted to find whether the charge was co-
ercive without a subjective inquiry into the impact the charges 
had on each jury member. Most likely, a statement to the effect 
that the jurors should retain their conscientiously held views will 
mitigate against any coercion which results from the Allen 
charge. 
There was no such fatal flaw in the Armstrong instructions. 
The lack of reciprocal language was only one factor in deciding 
whether the charges were valid, and unlike the absence of a 
statement that the jury members should retain their honestly 
held beliefs, was not coercion per se. The absence of reciprocal 
language did not increase the pressure felt by the minority mem-
bers of the jury to such a degree that the conviction should be 
reversed. The absence of such language, by itself, was not 
enough for the court to conclude that a juror would be coerced 
into rendering a vote in which he or she did not believe. 
In the future, trial courts may want to withhold giving Allen 
charges until necessary, such as when the jury is in deadlock. 
The court should also include a statement that the jury mem-
bers should retain their conscientiously held beliefs in light of 
pressure inherent in the court's instructions. Although Arm-
strong implies that an Allen charge may be given as both an 
original and supplementary instruction, the court distinctly 
noted that the judge's charge was only a 'pseudo-Allen' charge. 
Future supplementary Allen charges that do more than remind 
83. [d. at 1266 n.5. 
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the jury of the original instructions may still be deemed to vio-
late the per se rule. Thus, the trial court should be wary of ad-
ding more than a reminder to the jury of the earlier Allen 
charge. 
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